THE ESSENCE OF THE CALM OBSERVER,

ON THE SUBJECTS OF

THE

CONCERT OF PRINCES,

THE

DISMEMBERMENT OF POLAND,

AND

THE WAR WITH FRANCE.

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THE

THE ESSENCE OF THE CALM OBSERVER.

SECTION I.

ON THE CONCERT OF PRINCES.

AFTER the great Planets of our ſublunary world have, for ages, exerted their ſkill in oppoſitions, they are now at laſt trying the effect of conjunctions; and inſtead of waſting their ſtrength upon each other in hard blows, with little profit, and perpetual reſentment, they think it better for thoſe who are ſtrong to aſſociate with one another, againſt thoſe who are feeble.

I am afraid that their ſecret is too well founded upon the ſtate of human affairs, as the Triumvirs [*Ruſſia, Auſtria, and Pruſſia*] are placed in parts of the world which are diſunited, weak, or rich, and are able to make the ſame individuals, who fight unſucceſsfully in the hands of their enemies, become valuable recruits to augment their own forces. And be it remembered, that for many years the Triumvirs, ſeparately or jointly, have always been engaged in attempts at plunder; and that whatever plunder they have obtained by any peace, or in any convention, they have *permanently retained*, whether won from Poland, Turkey, Sweden, or in part even from Bavaria. Suppoſe the remnant of Poland then, and the French nation, to be next reduced; and ſuppoſe, that without either of theſe countries being farther diſſevered as to their territory, yet that both ſhould only

be taken out of the balance of Europe by internal circumſtances, or foreign influence, what is to become of Great Britain, after thirty-five millions of people are thus, as it were, annulled in Poland and France (if not oppoſed to her), when the Triumvirate is at the head of near ſixty other millions of people of their own? Has ſhe allies in Europe, or out of Europe, or allies upon another globe ready to take her part in ſuch a criſis? Will ſhe, who uſed to protect others herſelf, find any protectors? Will ſhe hang her fate upon the ſingle thread of a ſtate marriage, of which the death of *either* of the contracting parties, or the want of iſſue, or a counter ſtate marriage, or various other incidents may defeat the effect; and when the ally alſo to whom it ſeems to connect us, may have fallen a prey to falſe friendſhips, or have overſtrained himſelf by unweildy enterprizes, or may prefer a ſullen or politic neutrality to action in our favour, and when that alliance may be perverted to dangerous internal purpoſes? But the caſe is ſtrong enough on the footing of foreign politics, without alluding to the *conſtitutional* difficulties capable of ariſing out of it.

As the nature of the Britiſh Government recoils from a ſettled ſyſtem of conqueſt, and as we are ſtrong enough to excite jealouſy in conquerors, and rich enough to pay the expences of our own ſubduing, we are likely to become the objects of direct attack to thoſe whoſe plans we ſhall not aid, and which we may therefore endanger, unleſs we ourſelves are firſt diſabled; till by degrees we may at laſt arrive to the dignity of becoming a ſcape-goat, or make-weight, like Poland or Holland, in ſome of the quarrels, or ſome of the projects of the potentates of a higher order. Whether this is to happen now, or a little time hence, is not a point upon which we are permitted to calculate, ſince none at any period muſt have the power either directly to ruin us, or to alarm and enfeeble us, by driving us to the neceſſity of large defenſive armaments.

One of the ableſt and beſt informed ſtateſmen which this country ever produced, the noble author of the American peace, deprecated lately in parliament all ſupport of the "preſent military combination of Princes," even before we had ſeen it in overt-act,

overt-act. The liberties of man, and conſequently the progreſs of ſcience, of civilization, and the arts, have already enough to contend with in every ſtate viewed *ſeparately*. Whenever the powers veſted in government for uſeful purpoſes become abuſed to ambitious ones, in vain do individuals ſeek to reſiſt a great collective force inſtituted by themſelves. Deſpair ſometimes produces a counter union of the ſubjects, but as it commonly ends in an alteration of rulers rather than of principles, the evil complained of ſoon recurs. Hence there are few good governments in the world; ſo few, that our own nation thinks itſelf in poſſeſſion of the only one; and even this has required more than one ſucceſsful revolution to produce, or preſerve its perfection.

Such then is the ſtate of every ſingle country, even when the domeſtic enemy to its happineſs has none, except the forces of his own nation, at his diſpoſal. But a new ſcene at the preſent moment opens itſelf. Several Princes have agreed mutually to lend to one another the powers reſpectively entruſted to them for national objects, in order that each may thence be enabled to enforce his reſpective pleaſure upon his reſpective people. In other words, they engage to bring the military forces, and the revenues of all nations, to act, when requiſite, upon the people of any ſingle nation, although that people has already enough to ſtruggle with at home, whenever its own public force is applied to ſupport tyranny. As a counter-concert among the people of different nations is impoſſible, it is henceforth then intended, that Princes ſhall legiſlate at their own diſcretion, and that no nation ſhall ever be able to right its own wrongs: the example of Poland ever proving, that when a Prince is diſpoſed to concur with his own people in improving the conſtitution of the nation, permiſſion is to be denied, even for a meaſure of mutual happineſs. Each nation is therefore to be conſidered as deſigned to be governed by an enemy within, and an enemy without; and every order in ſociety, whether civil or religious, is to vaniſh before an union of military deſpotiſm.

Terrible as is this evil, it has led to one ſtill greater, becauſe more active, and having deeper conſequences; I mean the reunion of ſeveral Princes for the *ſubjugation of the reſt*. Each evil, however

however is founded upon the ſame common principle, namely, a military combination. In the one caſe, many Princes join from fear, and a common intereſt for domeſtic purpoſes; in the other, a few of the more potent league from a direct ambition for foreign conqueſts. In the one caſe, war is made againſt the people only; in the other, againſt both people and Princes. In the one caſe, the object may be negative, but in the other it is clearly poſitive. Events, perhaps, originally ſuggeſted only the firſt ſpecies of league to Auſtria and Pruſſia, but Ruſſia has now joined with them in forming the ſecond ſpecies; for it cannot be ſuppoſed that Auſtria and Pruſſia would lead their forces ſix hundred miles from home againſt France, with the *confeſſed* knowledge of the Ruſſian enterprize meditated againſt Poland, unleſs theſe three powers were in a *previous* and *perfect* underſtanding with each other, and embarked in a regular ſyſtem. An attack however upon Poland on one ſide, and France on the other, renders the ſubject of infinite importance to Great Britain; ſince ſucceſs may ripen the views of the parties into farther projects, not only dangerous to our tranquility and commerce, but even to our exiſtence.

In the time of the Greeks, Alexander became maſter of ſo much of the world, as had then figured in hiſtory, and the Romans afterwards nearly conquered all of it, which was known even to their geographers. But the preſent age is open to a ſtill more univerſal domination, every ſingle region of the globe being now diſcovered, and every quarter of the globe being within the power of Europe; ſo that it only remains to obtain the aſcendancy in Europe. As the ruin of Rome was accompliſhed by a triumvirate, ſo Auſtria, Ruſſia, and Pruſſia, taking advantage of the momentary prejudices of Europe againſt France, are formed at preſent into a triumvirate infinitely more formidable than thoſe of the two Cæſars, poſſeſſing among them forces the beſt diſciplined, and the moſt numerous in the world; together with dominions protected from all attack, either by means of ſituation, or by contiguity, and having a population of near ſixty millions of ſouls, which almoſt equals *half the popula-*

tion

tion of Europe, the whole maſs being trained into ſtrict obedience and union by the help of deſpotiſm.

The firſt prey marked out by this tripple-headed monſter is Poland; which, if ſubdued, will augment its dependents to near *ſeventy millions*. The next attempt forming is upon France, which if it ſucceeds, as it may do, (though God forbid!) their tremendous coalition will riſe to *above ninety millions of the moſt military people in the univerſe* (making almoſt three-fourths of our whole European population), commanding *a large navy*, and by ſtretching in a broad continued and impenetrable zone acroſs the whole middle of Europe, dividing the north of it from the ſouth. In the north of Europe there remain Denmark and Sweden, conſtituting a part of the Baltic ſhores; but as the Triumvirate poſſeſs the remainder of theſe ſhores, convenience, it is to be conceived, will form a ſufficient title with ambitious minds to ſeize upon the whole of them; ſo that theſe countries, after reſuming the name of Scandinavia, as a mark of ancient union, may be made ſubſervient to their navy and maritime reſources, (particularly ſince by perfecting the canal acroſs Holſtein, they will facilitate and quicken their own communication between the Baltic and the Atlantic, while the ſhutting up the paſſage of the Sound will totally cut it off to ſtrangers.) In the ſouth of Europe, none will doubt for a moment the fate of European Turkey. The parts of Italy not already ſubject to the Auſtrian connexion may become, in their turn, an eaſier conqueſt than even Turkey. It is at the ſame time certain, that Spain and Portugal, whoſe riches are a lure rather than a protection, will not offer a more ſucceſsful reſiſtance if attacked than France and Poland, eſpecially after France and Poland, and other conqueſts, ſhall have concurred, *as is intended*, to ſwell the mighty torrent. And as to Holland, it cannot avoid being drawn into the devouring vortex by intrigues or by fear. It is impoſſible to ſpecify in this place what will be the order and moment of any one of the above acquiſitions, it being ſufficient to our argument, that the *whole depends* only upon the convenience and will of the allied Potentates. Two other branches of Europe only remain to be noticed, of which one is the portion of

Germany

Germany not yet ſubject to Auſtria and Pruſſia, and the other, the Britiſh Empire.

I ſhall firſt touch upon Germany. And here I would obſerve, that Pruſſia neceſſarily muſt have formed its union with Auſtria upon principles of *mutual* advantage, ſince a propoſal, for example, for reſtoring to Auſtria ſingly, its aliance with France could not be thought ſincere; and the deſign of plunging Auſtria into a *diſpute with France* was not proper to be avowed, though as being ſtrongly to be ſuſpected, it was neceſſary to find powerful diſguiſes to it in other projects, which at the ſame time required to be of a nature to attract the concurrence of Ruſſia. Was it then a compaſſion for the French king and his family which was pretended? Surely, after the harſh treatment of the ſovereigns of Poland and Saxony, this pretext could weigh little with Auſtria, whoſe feelings indeed ſeem not very conſiderate with reſpect to that royal family, ſince Auſtria has hitherto increaſed the perils of it whenever ſhe has added to thoſe of the National Aſſembly and of France. Neither can Avignon and the papal power have been matter of ſerious concert between two ſovereigns, profeſſing the Greek or reformed religion on one ſide, and a court on the other, which has not only plundered the Catholic clergy in every quarter, but treated even the Pope with indifference in a late ſupplicatory viſit, which at once proved the injuries of the Pontiff, and the reſolution taken not to redreſs them. Of the ſame deſcription likewiſe is what reſpects the parties who are diſpoſſeſſioned in the German part of France, and who are affirmed to be under protection of the Empire; for the negociations on this ſubject having never been ſeriouſly countenanced by Pruſſia, and only officially or ſecondarily eſpouſed by Auſtria; Pruſſia and Auſtria cannot be conceived to have made themſelves principles in a hazardous and expenſive war, for a concern negligently purſued during three years reſpecting petty ſtates five or ſix hundred miles diſtant in the weſt of Germany, to whom in fact they are merely bound by *ceremonials*, to whom alſo an indemnity is offered by France, of whoſe cauſe the merits are more than equivocal, whoſe diſappointment likewiſe cannot be drawn into

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a precedent for other matters, and whom therefore it would be ſo eaſy and wiſe, on various accounts, to force into a compromiſe. Was the ground of *union* then a dread of *democratic principles?* I anſwer, no: for Pruſſia, for various and well known reaſons, is little expoſed to the operation of theſe; and ſhe had even a great deal to gain by their ſuperior tendency to infect the dominions of Auſtria, as well as to terminate the *offenſive and virtually excluſive* alliance ſubſiſting between Auſtria and France. Beſides, a prudent conduct, with the redreſs of grievances, and the aſſiſtance derivable from the concert of Princes, whenever danger occurred, rendered the King of Pruſſia much ſafer at home than a dubious war could make him; and if he had ſeen any real cauſe of dread behind him, he never would have marched the chief of his fineſt forces into diſtant countries, with himſelf at the head of them.

As to Ruſſia, whoſe ſubjects have no communication with the reſt of mankind, even in language, whoſe civilization muſt precede her liberty, and who, by the aid of one portion of her numerous ſubjects, can cruſh ſedition in the other, her Sovereign has nothing yet to fear from the declaration of the Rights of Man, which can divert her from her general ſyſtem of politics. If theſe ſeveral objects then furniſh no motive by which Pruſſia could at once both be *itſelf* actuated, and receive therein the concurrence of Auſtria, no motive which it could both *poſſeſs* ſecretly, and avow openly in the negociation, a negociation in which Ruſſia, we are always to remember bears a ſhare as a principal, nothing adequate remains in the way of motive but *ambition, and the deſire of conqueſt.* Theſe deteſtable incentives I affirm, are ſufficiently congenial to the practice of Princes to have been mutually offered and accepted, as the baſis of a newborn friendſhip between Courts long habituated to mutual jealouſy, oppoſition, and even hatred.

But does Pruſſia demand peculiar notice? If after ſhe has helped to diſmember France, ſhe does not accommodate and become the obedient ſervant of Auſtria and Ruſſia, is it not clear that ſhe is likely to be made their ſlave; unleſs Europe, upon recovering its ſenſes, (of which Pruſſia is perhaps likely to be firſt

to give the example) treads back its courſe of folly, and wages new wars, in order again to reſtore the poizes of Europe ſo idly diſturbed? Next it may be conceived, that France being our peculiar enemy, *it is wiſe to cripple her, ſince we may always truſt to our navy for our own protection* afterwards.

The patrons then of this opinion are not ſatisfied with the following recent changes *conſequent upon the new government* of France, namely, her total diſſolution of her alliances, as well with Auſtria as with Spain; her ſecret contempt for her foreign poſſeſſions (now in a ſtate of entire confuſion); and laſtly, the general terror of France, which is fixed in the minds of Europe. They forget alſo the double view to be taken of France, as our old *rival*, and as a *component part of Europe*. As a *rival*, we have always been able to reſiſt her, though ſhe had always power enough to be a ſalutary check upon our own ambition; and we have reſiſted her, becauſe ſhe had tranſatlantic views which led her into conteſts with our navy; and thus produced a vulnerability, and gave us a hold over her, *which influenced her conduct even in her continental politics* to a degree, which we could not otherwiſe have expected. As a *component part of Europe*, France has been peculiarly uſeful to us; for ſhe has ſuffered none to attain that ſupereminence in Europe to which ſhe has found it in vain herſelf to aſpire; and though ſhe has vexed us with intrigues, there was nothing in theſe to endanger either our exiſtence, or that of Europe, as long as ſhe held herſelf the general guardian of the whole, and eſpecially of the four weakeſt parts, (namely, Poland, Turkey, independent Germany, and the Italian States).

It is indeed the more unfortunate, that we forget this double character of France, ſince nothing is more certain, than that ſhe had adopted pacific principles at the commencement of her revolution, which we might eaſily have encouraged, and by her means have rendered univerſal to our own infinite advantage. But inſtead of this, ſhe has been forced into war, and into military principles, as well as into new extremes of democratic ones. Blinded then by the ſmoke and vapour of French politics, we forget the real fire from an oppoſite quarter that may

ſoon

ſoon devour Europe; and we go to war with France for ſpeeches and pamphlets (as Holland was formerly attacked for pamphlets and medals), forgetting that Meſſrs. Burke and Calonne have long been careſſed at court for their cruſading pamphlets, and that Mr. Burke, even in parliament, has always furniſhed the earlieſt pretexts of this deſcription for hoſtility. But America has given ſufficient proof that we ought to overlook words ſpringing from paſſion, for notwithſtanding the irritated ſtate of America ten years ago (which we have ſince taken ſo little pains to aſſuage), the Vice Preſident of the American Congreſs, and his ſon, have each written in favour of the Engliſh Conſtitution as oppoſed to that of France. The Secretary of State in America alſo has loſt popularity with many from his great partiality to France; and Mr. Paine himſelf, by his oppoſition to the death of Louis XVI. has ſhewn, that even Democracy has bounds wherever deſpair does not force men to overſtep them.

As to the omnipotence of our navy, I ſhall only obſerve, firſt, that a navy is more or leſs the neceſſary appendage of coaſts, and that the maſters of the whole of Europe muſt at the ſame time be the maſters of its coaſts; next, that a navy is ſubject to diſappointment from contrary winds, from calms, from ſtorms, and from uncertainty as to the motions of an enemy; and that after all, when ſo ſhort a trip is in queſtion as the paſſage from the neighbouring ſhores of Europe either to England or Ireland, leſs ſkill, leſs navy, and leſs apparatus are neceſſary than for wars carried on acroſs the ocean: that a ſucceſsful landing may eaſily end in the deſtruction of our dock-yards and naval ſtores, and that when the enemy ſhall once have entered our country, there is not a ſingle fortreſs in its internal parts to oppoſe him.

Theſe arguments become the more urgent, if we reflect, that Miniſtry *ſeem* not to be ſatisfied with a caſual co-operation with the confederates againſt France, but appear to be about to enliſt as confederates themſelves; or, in other words, not content with uſing the allies, they ſeem willing to *be uſed by them*. I confeſs I know none but *reſtraining* clauſes which ought to enter into any treaty with theſe allies: and for ſuch clauſes we are, I fear, too late, becauſe the war has already begun, and it is

only *previous to it* that we had much power for impoſing them. There is a ſecond occaſion for uneaſineſs at the conduct of Miniſtry, namely, their *ſilence as to the terms of peace*; which, as the open declaration of theſe terms would be uſeful and honorable, looks as if they were deſigned to be rendered rigorous in proportion to ſucceſs, and the rather, as Miniſtry make frequent uſe of the word "barrier," (that is againſt the views of France) without telling us whether they mean it in a metaphorical, or direct a political or territorial ſenſe. But if they deſign to ſtrip France of its eaſtern and ſouthern boundaries, will they not render it a country weak and open to its *continental* neighbours, and therefore liable to the alarming fate of Poland? Another objection which offers is, that (whether it ſhall happen by colluſion or deception) it is clearly in the power of Ruſſia, during the preſent conflict, to eſtabliſh for herſelf certain poſts, which ſhall ſerve her as ſtepping ſtones, to enable her to reach and to interfere with our immenſe empire in the Eaſt Indies. Nor is it uſeleſs to remark, that we are about to put ourſelves under the neceſſity of being the ſchoolmiſtreſs of Spain in her naval and military ſyſtems; our return received for which ſervices in the caſe of Ruſſia is now but too apparent.

But the following conſideration above all is here momentous. Having already ſeen, that merely by reducing the territory of France we ſhall diſturb the balance of Europe, it remains to be added, that this balance will alſo be affected, ſhould the confederacy reſtore the *old government* of France, even though without diminiſhing its territory. The Bourbon family cannot, in this caſe, attribute its return to power to Great Britain, who has ſo long affected neutrality, and who has been ſuppoſed to have been actuated throughout by ſelfiſh rather than by other motives; and who, if ſhe gains and retains any of the foreign poſſeſſions of the Republic, will, in the end, excite jealouſy in the Monarch of France; and if ſhe re-aſſigns them to the Monarch upon his reſtoration, will leave herſelf without any of the propoſed compenſations for her expenſive armaments, and fail in attaching to herſelf the royal debtor. To Auſtria alone will be given the peculiar merit of the original favour.

But as we are taught by wiſe men, that a ſenſe of obligation ſeldom ſinks deep in the minds of princes, a more powerful motive than gratitude will be called for, even towards Auſtria. It is not ſo much, however, in family relationſhip that we ſhall find this new motive, though that will have conſiderable influence in behalf of that power. But it will be found in the neceſſity of ſecuring a continuance of the aid of Auſtria, whoſe contiguity, ſtanding forces, and arbitrary form of government, enable her to adminiſter aſſiſtance with effect and eaſe for the purpoſe of keeping ſubjugated the majority of the French nation, which will either long remain refractory to monarchy, or at leaſt be ſuſpected of ſo doing by its monarch. Similar ſervices cannot be rendered to the Bourbon family by Great Britain, even were ſhe inclined to that effect, as her ſtanding army is trifling, and the genius and publicity of her government muſt naturally be oppoſed to ſuch an employment of her reſources, unleſs we ſuppoſe (which would infinitely confirm all our more general arguments), that in conſequence of the operation of the confederacy, our own government will become devoted to deſpotic purpoſes.

Thus the natural reſult of that degree of ſucceſs in the confederacy, which ſhall either enable it to diſmember France, or elſe to reſtore a Bourbon Monarch in it, will be, to violate the balance of power; for in the one view, the confederacy will derive ſtrength from the ſpoils of France; and in the other, from the voluntary and intereſted *concert* of its reſtored government in the cauſe of military deſpotiſm. It is therefore, among other reaſons, eſſential to our intereſt to procure an immediate and a general peace, leſt Auſtria ſhould gain ſuch an aſcendancy in France as ſhall enable her, either to reduce its territory, or remould its government; for ſhould ſhe once acquire that aſcendancy, and be ſupported in it by the confederates, it is difficult to ſay how Great Britain can counteract it, ſince we have no influence in Europe except in what reſpects the ſeas, the power of our *land-force* being nothing, and that of our *treaſure*, even when moſt laviſhed, being ſecondary feeble and uncertain, as may be known from hiſtory and reaſon.

It is enough for a wiſe man then to put to himſelf the following queries: Have Pruſſia and Auſtria forgotten their political antipathies, and has Ruſſia joined itſelf to them? Are they powerful both ſeparately and in union? Are they ambitious, and have they got *ſcent*, and in part almoſt poſſeſſion of the prey at preſent in their purſuit? Can they be falſe to *others*, when it is their intereſt to be falſe; and true to *themſelves*, when it is their intereſt to be true; and have they not already learned in Poland the ſecret of gaining dominion *without* war by a friendly compromiſe? What ſtands then in the way of a ſecond partition of Poland, when their forces are in the heart of it, in ſpite of old promiſes and a recent treaty? Are they not already alſo on the frontier of France? Have they not faſcinated every court of Europe by ſpecious arguments, or by real terrors, ſo as to leave the nations they are attempting to hunt down bereft of every ally? Are they not acting upon a deep plan long concerted, and kept profoundly ſecret? Are not military operations by their nature rapid; and ſhall we ſtand like gaping ideots, ſtaggered by the very *force* of truth, and yet crying out, is all this *poſſible?* Yes, it is poſſible; a part of it is acting, a conſpiracy (which will eventually become one againſt the whole human race) is begun, ſuch as never was begun before, becauſe it never was practicable before; and its object is in part even compleated before we have adverted to its exiſtence.

Where is the Britiſh miniſter, is he dead? Does he truſt to cobweb treaties, to flimſy faith, to family connexions, when an event, when a *revolution*, as extraordinary as that of France is under iſſue, ſome of the eſſential parts of which may be accompliſhed in the following three months of this campaign in a way never to be recalled? Will not every conqueſt made by the Triumvirate ſtand upon a common bottom; and will not the Triumvirate find a common intereſt in mutually perſiſting in them (as in the caſe of Poland, where, though humanity pleaded for favour to its miſerable remnant, yet the fear of the doctrine of reſumption operating, and one crime leading to another, the ſame Triumvirate which robbed it in 1775, not only refuſes to it a conſtitution, which might reſtore it to its ſtrength and its poſſeſſions,

poſſeſſions, but apparently meditates a farther diviſion of its territory) ? Does the miniſter wiſh then the ruin, not only of Britain but of *mankind*, to be dated from the æra of his adminiſtration ? Will he hazard his character with the preſent age and poſterity by a falſe, or by a negligent ſtep, in the moſt momentous tranſaction which ever came under the deliberation of man ? Will he allow it to be ſaid, that he had not eyes to ſee the imminent danger, nor addreſs or power to avert it ? Succeſs itſelf in an *eſcape* will not permit the world to forgive him for leaving any thing upon this occaſion to the ſlighteſt hazard. A wiſe man never gives the ſtaff in politics out of his hand ; never truſts himſelf to thoſe who make a merit of ſucceſsful deceit ; never places the public ſafety of which he is maſter in the hands of men of whom he is not maſter.

In politics, none muſt have a *power* joined to an *intereſt* to do miſchief, whatever be the purity of their original intentions ; for if they poſſeſs it, the miſchief ſooner or later will be committed, and promiſes will be as eaſily, as early, and as unfeelingly broken as thoſe of Pruſſia to Poland.

As to the concert of Princes, as far as it is directed againſt pretended *ſeditions* in this country, it is not only dangerous in a conſtitutional view, but it is uſeleſs ; and as far as it is aimed againſt Prince and People united, its evils are ſtill greater. Fatal indeed would be our ſituation, if our Sovereign attempted to enter into foreign combinations of a deſpotic and offenſive nature, ſo ill ſuited to the genius both of our nation and of its government—but no leſs fatal would it be to *himſelf*, becauſe, whoever cannot give eſſential aid, or cauſe eſſential terror, to the Triumvirate, may be uſed at firſt as an inſtrument, but muſt naturally at laſt become its victim, as being the only concluding ſervice to which he can be applied. The family dominions of Hanover and Oſnaburgh, and the foreign dominions of the Britiſh Crown, would ſucceſſively diſappear, and with them at laſt the very ſeat of Government, but not before terror had led him to abandon rotten boroughs, corruption, religious teſts, laws, &c. &c. both here and in Ireland, as well as every prejudice, however fondly cheriſhed, which could prevent the chearful and

effectual

effectual concurrence of every portion of his people in the general defence. If he means therefore to remain his *own maſter* at home and abroad, he muſt beware of contributing to form a foreign tribunal ſuperior to himſelf, in which other aſſociated Potentates already poſſeſs a lead, which by the nature of their population, reſources, and continental ſituation, they muſt *always retain.*

SECTION II.

ON THE ABANDONMENT OF POLAND BY PRUSSIA; WITH AN ADDRESS TO THE EMPRESS OF RUSSIA.

THE direliction of Poland is both a diſgrace and an affliction to human nature; but when Princes abandon their engagements, they deſerve every expoſure.

The motives of Pruſſia, with reſpect to Poland, have been too clear to be miſinterpreted. While ſhe was jealous of the progreſs of Auſtria and Ruſſia againſt the Turks, or while ſhe hoped for the voluntary ceſſion of Dantzick and Thorn from Poland, Poland was to be ſupported; but when the fear of Auſtria and Ruſſia ſubſided, and Poland refuſed to commit ſuicide, the moſt ſolemn treaties become annulled, and Poland muſt expiate its guilt by a ſecond diſmemberment.

Perhaps hiſtory does not furniſh a greater inſtance of political deluſion than is at preſent exhibited by Pruſſia. Ruſſia has already above four times as many inhabitants, and Auſtria above three times as many as Pruſſia; and each of theſe powers either poſſeſſes, or is likely to acquire, new tracts of territory ſufficient to enable them to double their preſent numbers, beſides a proſ-

pect

pect of enjoying conſiderable encreaſed advantages, as to trade, navigation, and wealth. On the other hand, as the reſources of Pruſſia, both preſent and future, are peculiarly limited, both as to extent and poſition, the loſs of the *barrier* formed by Poland againſt theſe formidable powers cannot be compenſated by any temporary acquiſition of *booty*; ſince one third of the Poliſh ſpoils in the hands of Pruſſia can be no equipoiſe to two thirds of them in the hands of theſe rivals if they act in concert.

Auſtria and Ruſſia are of a ſize to be always impregnable, even in ſpite of bad government; but bounded and artificial ſtates like Pruſſia, can only be ſecure when there are many other ſtates jealous of the larger ones with which it can ally itſelf. A ſtate, whoſe chief ſtrength depends upon an army, and upon a treaſure moſt ridiculouſly magnified, only requires a laviſh prince, and a fooliſh choice of generals, or extravagant projects, to overthrow it beyond redemption.

But Pruſſia acts not only againſt her intereſt, and againſt juſtice, but againſt her peremptory engagements. Look at the ſixth article of the recent treaty with Poland. It will there appear, that an oppoſition to foreign interferance in the internal affairs of Poland is diſtinctly undertaken by Pruſſia with a view to Ruſſia; and that this article of the treaty is ſo peculiarly fitted to the predicament of Poland ſingly, that it is not even thought of being made *reciprocal* in favour of Pruſſia.—And what is the pretext for abandoning this Treaty? It is, that the *Empreſs of Ruſſia has ſhewn a decided oppoſition to the order of things eſtabliſhed in Poland on May* 3, 1791, *and is provoked by Poland preſuming to put herſelf into a poſture of defence to ſupport it.* It will be ſeen however, by the annexed documents, that nothing was effected on the 3d of May 1791, to which Pruſſia had not previouſly aſſented, and which ſhe did not afterwards ſanction; and that Pruſſia, according to the aſſertion of her own king, did not intimate a ſingle doubt reſpecting the revolution till one month (and according to the Pruſſian miniſter, till ſix months) after it had taken place: in ſhort, to uſe the Monarch's own words, as fully explanatory of his double politics, "not till the *general tranquility of Europe* permitted him

"to

" to explain himſelf." Inſtead therefore of aſſiſting Poland, Pruſſia inſultingly recommends to Poland to retrace her ſteps, in which caſe, ſhe *ſays*, that ſhe will be ready to *attempt* an *accommodation* in her favour.

Is it thus then that treaties, and the happineſs of nations, are ſported with? Has not Poland already done ſervice under this very treaty, by omitting to ſeek an alliance with Ruſſia and Auſtria, and by attaching herſelf to Pruſſia, when Pruſſia wanted every weight to help her to ſave the Turks? Has Pruſſia done any permanent counter-ſervice? On the contrary; is not the whole of the war between Poland and Ruſſia, with all its conſequences, to be placed to her account? Was there any article in the treaty to prevent Poland changing her conſtitution, or any article to limit the aid of Pruſſia to the late preciſe form of that conſtitution? On the contrary; is not the protection of Poland from foreign interferance in her internal affairs an avowed *caſus fœderis*, being the ſubject of one entire article of the treaty, rendered ſtill ſtronger by the covenant being *wholly* confined to the benefit of Poland? How ſtrange would be the doctrine, that becauſe one nation forms an alliance with another, it is not therefore *ſui juris* in its own concerns, eſpecially when it is at the ſame time univerſally admitted, that the contracting parties may form ſubſequent alliances with *other foreign powers*, which in the event may frequently militate with the prior engagements?

" And will *you* then, great Catherine, you, who already " poſſeſs far more of the globe than any other power upon the " face of it, will you ſpoil this fair work of human hands? " Will you, a lover of ſcience, replunge a large diſtrict of the " earth into the cruel barbariſm in which it has been held by " means of its government for centuries, not omitting the period " when you preſided over it? And will you fruſtrate that *in-* " *dependence* which may ſave Poland from falling into the hands " of an enemy in future times? Your power is certain, but " deſpotiſm and injuſtice, whatever may be the fate of demo- " cratic principles, cannot now obtain the eſteem or the praiſe " of an European public. Your guarantee of the former Poliſh

" conſtitution

" conſtitution can only ſerve as a reaſon for preventing the pre-
" ſent conſtitution from being changed for a *worſe*, and not
" againſt the introduction of a *better* in its place. Be known
" then by the good you do, and not by the evil: ſeek for the
" bleſſings of mankind, and not for their curſes. It is eaſy for
" the ſtrong to add to their ſtrength, but it is not given to every
" one to ſhew magnanimous forbearance. Beſides, the term of
" nature (to which, alas, you know the proudeſt of us muſt ſub-
" mit) does not promiſe you many years longer for the rule of
" human affairs; and you are in a great meaſure ignorant of
" the characters of thoſe who are to come after you to conduct
" your various ſyſtems and dominions: perhaps too, theſe may
" be uſurpers inſtead of your own iſſue. But if your plans of
" *conqueſt* are irrevocable, at leaſt inſure to Poland a *good go-*
" *vernment*. In an age, when it is ſaid, that Princes are to be
" ſupported, if the King of *Poland only* is oppreſſed, it will be
" thought that he found no favour from his fellow ſovereigns,
" only becauſe he was ſuppoſed the moſt amiable among them.
" Time, on account of this Prince's age, muſt ſoon remove him,
" in order to make way for a ſucceſſor, who, by the Poliſh
" laws, muſt be found out of his family. Let the Poliſh go-
" vernment then remain as now projected, even if you ſeek to
" change the intended line of deſcent of the crown. The al-
" terations of the conſtitution are of ſuch a happy nature, being
" at once favourable to the nation, and to its Prince, that the
" King of Poland has performed herein an acceptable ſervice
" for *every ſovereign* who ſhall ſucceed him in that country.
" Be the reſtorer then of kingdoms, but not their confounder.
" Let the ſtigma of your late manifeſto be wiped away as ſpeedy
" as poſſible from the memory of the public, where the ſhock
" it has given to your reputation is beyond your means of com-
" prehending it, becauſe none can poſſibly dare to tell it to you.
" Be aſſured, great Princeſs, that while the applauſe of men is
" worth receiving, it is neceſſary that they ſhould be *civilized*;
" and when they are civilized, it is impoſſible, whatever they
" may write or ſay in public, that they can ever *think* or *ſay* in
" private, that princes are not bound to promote the happineſs

" of our race in uniſon with their own. I will go further, and " affirm, that princes will always in reality be deemed ſecon- " dary characters, and that nations will always be held the " principals; and that thoſe ſovereigns, who cannot upon oc- " caſion perſonally ſacrifice themſelves to the people depending " upon them, or for their ſakes reſtrain a weak ambition within " proper bounds, are wholly unworthy of their ſtations. As " the power of princes cannot ſurvive the grave, the mighty " monarch when dead, leaves behind him a republic in the " living; the page of hiſtory becomes his tribunal; there are " none ſo humble as not to find defenders at it, and a ſingle " ſentence, founded in truth in the preſent enlightened times, " is ſufficient to lay proſtrate the proudeſt character if really " unworthy of fame. The reaſon is evident—it is, that men " are impartial to the dead, who excite neither their fears nor " their hopes.

" Hence it is, that the venal pen is found an inſufficient pro- " tection, even to the fame of Peter the Great, as he is called, " though enſhrined by Voltaire; the world having lately be- " come inſtructed as to his manners, before concealed from " them by the obſcurity in which Ruſſia and its concerns ſo " long lay buried."

As to Auſtria, who has forfeited no particular faith upon this occaſion, I ſhall no farther obſerve upon her conduct, than to notice, how little *family* connexion among princes is to be depended upon, when the Saxon family is ſlighted by Auſtria: and as to the ſmall reſpect of Princes for *perſonal* worth, it is alike ſeen in the little deference ſhewn both to the Saxon Elector, and the Poliſh Monarch, upon this occaſion. In what have the Jacobines of France done worſe than the Triumvirate, to which Poland and Saxony are ſacrificed? Does not every thing ſeem to prove, that whither abſolute power is in the hands of one, of three, or of many, it is ſure to be abuſed?

Article Sixth of the Treaty of Defenſive Alliance between his Majeſty the King and the Republic of Poland, and his Majeſty the King of Pruſſia, dated March 29, 1790.

If any foreign power whatever ſhall, by virtue of any preceding acts or ſtipulations, or any interpretation of them, aſſume the right of interfering in the internal affairs of the Republic of Poland, or its dependencies, at any time, or in any manner, his Majeſty the King of Pruſſia will firſt employ his moſt efficacious good offices to prevent hoſtilities ariſing out of ſuch a pretenſion; but if all his good offices ſhould fail of effect, and hoſtilities againſt Poland ſhould be the conſequence, his Majeſty the King of Pruſſia, conſidering this as a caſe falling within the meaning of the Alliance, will aſſiſt the Republic, according to the tenor of the fourth article of the preſent Treaty.

Extract of a Letter from the Abbé P. to the Pruſſian Miniſter at Warſaw, dated 28 May, 1792.

The territory of Poland is violated. A neighbouring power comes in arms to diſturb the operations of our Diet. This is the caſe provided for in the ſixth article in the Treaty. This is virtually what the note of Count Chreptowicz tells you, and whatever turn might have been given to it, it could in ſubſtance have told you nothing elſe. There is then nothing oppoſed to the principles which you have recently renounced, for you have never ſaid to us, your ally, that our frontiers would be attacked; and that you, our powerful friend, would ſee it with indifference, or feel diſpenſed from your engagements. As to what I call *your work*, and which Poland is happy in owing to you, it is preciſely that which brings the war upon us. The declaration of the Ruſſian Envoy is a proof of this which cannot be anſwered. It is there you ſee *every one* of the reſolutions of this Republic, your ally, ſince the commencement of the actual Diet, brought

as charges againſt us. Call to mind the periods, and you will agree, that the act of the 3d of May, 1791, is but the reſult of it; or, to ſpeak more correctly, *a combination of the ſeveral preceding ſteps*, in which you may call yourſelf the great mover: *pars magna fui.*

The fundamental articles of the New Conſtitution were adopted under *your auſpices*; and it was through you that the Court of Berlin teſtified its approbation at the cloſe of 1789. The choice of the Elector of Saxony to the throne of Poland, during the life of our preſent King (in which all the Palatinates were unanimous), was alike applauded. The election of dynaſtics or families to the throne, was diſtinctly propoſed in the great project of reform laid before the States by the deputation on the 4th of Auguſt, 1790, and became the expreſs ſubject of deliberation. The manner in which the King, your maſter, condeſcended through Mr. Goltz, on the 8th of May, 1791, to anſwer to our communication of the proceedings of the 3d of May of that year, was far from expreſſing, that theſe proceedings were of a nature at all novel to his Majeſty.

Extract of a Letter from the King of Pruſſia, to the King of Poland, dated 23 May, 1791.

I am happy to have been able *to contribute to the ſupport of the liberty and independence of Poland*; and one of my moſt pleaſing cares ſhall be, to maintain and ſtrengthen the ties which unite us.

Letter of the King of Pruſſia to the King of Poland.

Sir, my Brother, Berlin, June 8, 1792.

The Grand Marſhall of Lithuana, the Compt de Potocke, has delivered to me your Majeſty's letter, dated the 31ſt May. I there ſee, with regret, the embarraſſment in which Poland finds itſelf now involved. But I will acknowledge, with equal frankneſs,

neſs, that after all that has paſſed for the laſt *twelve* months, theſe embarraſſments were to be *foreſeen*. Your Majeſty will recollect, that on more than one occaſion the Marquis de Luccheſini was charged to manifeſt, not only to you, but to the preponderating members of the government, my juſt apprehenſions on this ſubject. From the moment that the general re-eſtabliſhment of tranquility in Europe permitted me to explain myſelf, and that the Empreſs of Ruſſia had ſhewn a decided oppoſition to the order of things eſtabliſhed on the 3d of May, 1791, my way of thinking, and the language of my miniſters, have never varied; and in obſerving, with a tranquil eye, the new conſtitution which the Republic has given to itſelf without my privity or concurrence, I have never had the idea either of ſupporting or protecting it. I have predicted on the contrary, that the threatening meaſures, and the warlike preparations, which the Diet unceaſingly deliberated upon one after another, would infallibly provoke the reſentment of the Empreſs of Ruſſia, and draw upon Poland the evils which they were undertaken to avoid. The event fully ſatisfied theſe appearances; and one cannot diſſemble in the preſent moment, that *without the new form of government for the Republic, and without the efforts which they have announced for ſupporting it*, the Court of Ruſſia would not have determined on the vigorous proceedings ſhe has now embraced.

Whatever be the friendſhip that I have *ſworn* to your Majeſty, and the intereſt I take in every thing that concerns you, you will yourſelf believe, that the ſtate of things being *entirely changed ſince the alliance that I contracted* with the Republic, and the preſent conjuncture brought on by the conſtitution of the 3d of May, 1791, poſterior to my treaty, *not being applicable* to the engagements therein ſtipulated, it does not belong to me to reſiſt the attack made on your Majeſty, if the intentions of the patriotic party are ſtill the ſame, and if they perſiſt in the deſire of maintaining their *own* work; but if *retracing their ſteps* they ſhall conſider the difficulties that are ariſing upon all ſides, I ſhall be ready to *concert* meaſures with her Majeſty the Empreſs of Ruſſia, and to explain myſelf at the ſame time with the

Court

Court of Vienna, to ſtrive to reconcile the different intereſts, and to agree on meaſures capable of reſtoring to Poland its *tranquility*.

I flatter myſelf, that your Majeſty will find in theſe diſpoſitions, and in theſe aſſurances, the ſentiments of *ſincere* friendſhip, and of the conſideration with which I am,

Your Majeſty's good *Brother*,

FREDERICK-WILLIAM.

SECTION III.

REMARKS ON THE FIRST DIVISION OF POLAND, THE AUSTRIANS HAVING, IN 1771, ENTERED THE LORDSHIP OF ZIPS, IN POLAND, UPON PRETEXT OF SOME MONEY DUE TO THEM BY THE REPUBLIC, WHEN THE EMPRESS OF RUSSIA TOLD PRINCE HENRY OF PRUSSIA, THAT IF AUSTRIA DISMEMBERED POLAND, OTHER NEIGHBOURS HAD A RIGHT TO DO THE SAME.

IT is prettily ſaid by ſome one, that when a lamb is once devoted, any thicket into which it happens to ſtray will furniſh the fuel neceſſary for its ſacrifice. But here Poland had not ſtrayed, and the only thing to impute to it was, that itſelf was weak, and that its ſacrificers were ſtrong. They looked out for pretexts therefore againſt this lamb, juſt as the wolf did in the fable; for it was not the pretext for the ſlaughter which offered itſelf firſt to their minds, but the reſolution to devour; and the pretext was only produced, becauſe the affairs of Princes ſeemed to require certain ceremonials. But if kingdoms are allowed to be merely private properties, it would follow (as the

King

King ſaid regarding the Dantzickerſ, that at leaſt, *chacun eſt maitre chez ſoi*, every one is uncontrolled at home. But this principle, which was deſigned to hold good againſt Dantzick, whenever raviſhed from Poland, was not allowed to operate in preſerving its connexion with Poland, it being the rule of military princes, that *might* makes *right*. To have a clearer idea of the caſe before us, let it be ſuppoſed, that to two litigants who were harraſſed with an expenſive and dubious civil ſuit, a third party ſhould ſuggeſt as follows: "An eaſy prize, more "valuable than that for which you ſtruggle, offers; it belongs "indeed to another, but if you find reſiſtance, it will be a reaſon "to ſtrip the party of his whole poſſeſſions; but in the mean "time, though I aſſume the guiſe of a mediator between you, "I claim a third of the ſpoil, to enable me to meet you on pro-"portional terms, ſhould I have future diſputes with either of "*yourſelves*." A ſecond partition of Poland, however, at this inſtant would be ſtill more flagrant than the firſt, becauſe the Triumvirs having no contentious ſuit at iſſue, and Poland having lately aſſumed a reſpectable face in her internal government, the partition could only ſtand upon the principle which juſtifies any three men in private life in robbing a weaker fourth.

In the brief negociation before us, we have ſeen Pruſſia firſt in an underſtanding with both of its rivals, and then thwarted by both of them; next, we have obſerved that Poland, which ſprang like the ram from the buſh to become an offering for another, and which was to prove an univerſal pannacea, failed after all in procuring an immediate peace for Turkey, and did not prevent the war in 1778 about Bavaria: and when the peace was made for Turkey, Turkey was only found to be ſaved from Ruſſia to be pillaged by Auſtria. Since the year 1777, Auſtria has been repeatedly embroiled with Pruſſia, and Pruſſia with Ruſſia. Lately indeed there have followed ſcenes of amity; for firſt, Ruſſia and Auſtria have come into league; next, Pruſſia has aſſociated with Turkey and Poland; and then, after abandoning both of theſe powers, Pruſſia has joined itſelf to Ruſſia and Auſtria, in order to eſtabliſh a more powerful triumvirate. But whether it was an alliance made, or an alliance broken, the

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reaſon was the ſame, each party acted for his intereſt at the moment, and therefore, as no bonds could be a ſecurity againſt tergiverſation, ſo no enmity ever rendered a reconciliation hopeleſs. The ſame for guarantees. The Triumvirate guaranteed the fragment of Poland, and yet Ruſſia immediately governed it as a Roman province; and its independence is again attacked by Ruſſia and the other Triumvirs at the preſent moment. The Poliſh diſſidents, for whom Pruſſia fought previous to the firſt partition, are the very ſame perſons whom Ruſſia is now oppoſing; and *vice verſa* as to her then opponents. The old form of government in Sweden alſo was long under the guarantee of Ruſſia; yet Ruſſia afterwards confirmed the ſcandalous change made in it by its deceaſed Monarch, becauſe it ſuited her politics.

I ſhall only allude to, but not enlarge upon, various other events in the Low Countries, and other parts of the Auſtrian dominions, as well as in Liege, Holland, Turkey, and Sweden, all of which ſhew, that amidſt outward civilities there may be ſecret intrigues; and that when the turn is ſerved, *ſauve qui peut*, no matter for the hindmoſt. Two ſmaller traits in the hiſtory of the above negociation indicate the King of Pruſſia's want of fidelity, not under the preſſure of ſubſequent circumſtances, but even at the moment of framing his engagements, I mean where he deſiſts from his demand of the *town* of Dantzick, becauſe he could afterwards make himſelf maſter of it; and where he ſigned an article for furniſhing ſuccours to Ruſſia againſt Auſtria, with which it is clear he never deſigned to comply, though he ſtates it as his mental pretext, that they never could be called for. But the King of Pruſſia's adjuſtment of the difficulty about the *extra* encroachments of Auſtria beyond the original compact, by making equivalent encroachments on his ſide, is not leſs in point than the reſt. One would think, that this ſagacious politician had taken his hint (for wiſe men turn ſmall hints to great account) from the monkey in the fable, who had to divide a ſtolen cheeſe between two cats, and that, like the monkey, in balancing the more and the leſs, he would have approved of a ſwallow of the whole of Poland, had

he

he not been afraid of the reſt of Europe diſturbing the repaſt. I ſhall add another circumſtance under this head; which is, that the ſilence of Princes, and their petty bickerings, form as little ſafeguard as their promiſes; for the treaty for the partition of Poland, after being firſt made between double, and then between triple parties, and meeting many delays and fluctuations, burſt forth upon the Poles at the end of ſecret conferences between the Triumvirs, which had laſted during *a year and an half*; and the late movements of M. Biſhopſwoerder, prove that the preſent plans of the Triumvirate have alſo been concerted, and waiting for the ſeaſon of their execution for a number of months. And can any nation then, and eſpecially a free nation, where powerful military princes are concerned, count itſelf ſafe upon any other principle than its own vigilance, and its exciting that of other powers? I do not however accuſe the late King of Pruſſia of duplicity in the pacific, and even paternal language, which he held at the cloſe of his life, which every prince ought deeply to ſtudy; nor do I ſuppoſe, that this change was altogether like that of certain females, whoſe morals improve with age, owing to diſtinguiſhed paſſions, and the offenſive progreſs of younger candidates for admiration. On the contrary, his philoſophic purſuits, and his improvement of his dominions (where he verified his ſimilie, that "Princes ought to be like the ſpear of Achilles, which inflicts wounds and cures them; which cauſes miſchiefs to nations, and ſhould repair them"), I ſay, his conduct in theſe regards, ſhewed that he was worthy of much eſteem. In like manner the Empreſs of Ruſſia, in many particulars, commands the reſpect of Europe; and the late Emperor Joſeph merited far more applauſe than he has received. But unfortunately they were *military* potentates; and ſtill more to infatuate them, they were *triumvirs*; and the faſcinations of uncontrouled power are too much for human virtue and human intellect long to withſtand.

The diſtruſt which theſe great powers manifeſted for one another, is very inſtructive to the reſt of Europe. They certainly acted wiſely, for they knew their own characters. But is it not wonderful, that Great Britain ſhould omit to copy the

diffidence exhibited by ſuch good judges, founded on their reſpective ſelf-knowledge, and confirmed by public and private incidents regarding each other? Indeed, thoſe who are read in deplomatic memoirs are ſenſible, that the above negociation is but a ſample for all the reſt. When royal perſonages therefore call each other brothers, couſins, and friends, they only deſign to ſignify, that they are of a different race from their ſubjects, and that in ſpite of all their double dealings, they are connected excluſively with *one another* as *princes*.

SECTION IV.

NATIONS HAVE NO RIGHT TO INTERFERE IN THE INTERNAL GOVERNMENT OF ONE ANOTHER.

THE ſame perſons who affirm, that *Foreigners* may interfere in the government of another country, aſſert, that the natives of that country are altogether deſtitute of ſuch a privilege reſpecting themſelves. The two opinions, however, are perfectly conſiſtent, for they both imply, that nations have no rights; and that princes, either foreign or native, muſt be free from check in all they meditate againſt them.

The facts which the following pages exhibit on the ſubject of the *interference of foreigners* in matters of internal government, of themſelves diſplay a levity of motive, a profligacy of principle, a treachery of means, and an extremity of cruelty, which in ſome degree prove the falſity of the principle by the nature of its conſequences.

We acknowledge then in private life, that if any individual *ſpeaks* uninvited in the concerns of another, it is impertinent; and ſtill more if he *acts* in them; but epithets are wanting to deſcribe

deſcribe the character of him who intermeddles in the concerns of another by force. Every great collection of men, however, upon its reſpective territory, whatever be its latitude, colour and deſcription, is equally its own maſter with an individual.

Nations indeed are as *units* to one another, even in a ſtill ſtronger ſenſe than individuals, becauſe in private concerns there is a general tribunal for diſtributive juſtice, in order to protect the injured; but as no ſuch appeal and protection exiſt with reſpect to injured nations, the rule in morals applies, that principles require to be ſedulouſly upheld in proportion to the riſque of their infraction, and the magnitude of the intereſt at ſtake. This is ſaid on the ſubject of pure interference by one nation in the government of another, as in the caſe of Poland; but even in a caſe of pure *external contention* (which the war with France is falſely pretended to be), the mutual appeal to arms ſhews how little ſway at any time is left for *juſtice* between nation and nation; and conſequently, how ſtrict ſhould be the abſtinence from all ſtruggle directed with a view to internal interference. What has been ſaid will appear ſtill more clear, if we recollect, that the competence of a court of juſtice to try a given caſe, implies the poſſeſſion of the means of obtaining evidence reſpecting it, eſpecially by confronting the parties; and that without this is done in the caſes in queſtion, the interfering power acts with ſtill more injuſtice than is charged upon the Convention when ſitting in judgment upon Louis XVI. Beſides war, which is the agent, which muſt in general be employed upon theſe occaſions, preſents a very *expenſive*, as well as an uncertain court of judicature; and it ſeems highly improper for any government to charge its ſubjects with the burthen of fighting to convert another nation, not to forget how much it tends permanently to embitter two nations, when one of them in effect promotes a civil war in the other. In ſhort, none ſhould govern who do not partake in the conſequences of their own government; and for a ſtill ſtronger reaſon, none ſhould govern who have different and even oppoſite intereſts reſpecting the governed, or who are ignorant of their local circumſtances, their mental and other habits.

If nations, however, are at any time to ſubmit to a controlling power from without, it can only be to that of other nations perfectly *ſelf-governed*, and who therefore may claim kindred feelings with them; though even theſe muſt confine themſelves to caſes of *natural juſtice*, and not over-rule in matters of mere *political option*. But in no ſenſe are tyrants or arbitrary monarchs to interfere, who are only *parts*, and the worſt parts of a nation, whoſe anxiety is not to govern well, but merely to govern; who in foreign politics never conſult any thing but their own intereſt; whom abſolute power has debaſed in their own perſons, and who, by abſolute power, reciprocally debaſe their people, and who by dreading to give efficacy to the wiſhes of their *own* nation, prove that they can have little attachment to the happineſs of any others. What in general is an *arbitrary prince*, but one who begins life with a ſpoiled education; whoſe paſſions are afterwards left unreſiſted; from whom truth is anxiouſly concealed; whoſe very faults are flattered; who thinks himſelf born to rule; who ſuppoſes that every enterprize againſt his neighbours is permiſſible which is practicable; who deems wars only blameable when they are unſucceſsful; and who thinks that he has done little to figure in hiſtory unleſs he alters the boundaries of geography without, and increaſes the ſubmiſſiveneſs of his people within? If this be the portrait applicable to the generality of arbitrary princes, I aſk, whether we ſee in it any encouragement to truſt them with the fate of more nations than thoſe they controul already, and whether thoſe politicians deſerve well of mankind, who ſeek to propagate the principle, that arbitrary princes can commonly decide better for foreign nations than thoſe nations can decide for themſelves, and thus open the way for them to legiſlate for mankind *univerſally*? I allow, that nations may eaſily do wrong; but ſince arbitrary princes ſo ſeldom ſeek to do right, and ſo ſeldom perform well the right they ſeek to do, I muſt affirm, that no principle or rule ought to be laid down which is ſo likely to be fatal in every inſtance of its practice as that in queſtion.

But even between nation and nation, *ſelf-intereſt* is no juſt ground for intermeddling in matters of internal government againſt

againſt the wiſh of a majority. What, for example, ſhould we ſay in private life to the man, who ſhould prevent his neighbour by force from improving his eſtate, leſt he ſhould underſell him at market; or from educating his children well, leſt they ſhould become ſuperior to his own; or from employing good counſellors, leſt he ſhould be unſucceſsful in a law ſuit againſt him? And what ſhould we ſay, if, in order to accompliſh theſe unjuſt and injurious purpoſes, he added to force both *devaſtation and murder?* But if theſe horrid means are not to be employed to obtain *poſitive advantages*, neither are they to be reſorted to for averting ſmall or imaginary *inconveniences*. For example, if the French write libels upon the Britiſh Government, or if, in a manner ſtill more ſpeaking than a libel, namely, by practice, they ſhall hereafter ſhew their new government, whatever it may be, to be preferable to our own, this will furniſh no ligitimate cauſe for obſtructing their attempts towards forming a government of their own choice.

To ſilence the printing preſſes of France is uſeleſs, becauſe we have laws of our own ſufficient to prevent the *circulation* of any thing improper which is printed; and if the example of a better government in France ſhould ever become obnoxious, the only ligitimate antidote will be to improve our own, our predilection to our ancient government being ſufficient to prevent a raſh adoption of foreign novelties. But alas! a hazard ſo conſoling to a well-wiſher of mankind ſeems not to be very imminent. And as to any riſques offering to our external ſafety, commerce, or other national object from France as her government ſtands conſtituted at preſent, where is the man who fears them? or, if he fears them, ought he not infinitely more to fear them in caſe of France being re-united (through the medium of foreign interpoſition) to all and more than thoſe *foreign allies* by which France has heretofore rendered herſelf formidable?

But may we not interfere caſually, and as it were *obiter*, it may be ſaid in the government of France in the courſe of our foreign warfare with her, and give her a government more ſuited to our own purpoſes, and to her own happineſs, than that which ſhe at preſent poſſeſſes? I anſwer, no. For firſt, it is a

violation

violation of principle, and principles are never more fatally violated than when the pretext for it is plauſible. A *little and a little* is eaſily made into *a little more*; a collateral object carried on under the cover of a principal one, is eaſily itſelf made a principal one; and no political violence is apt to go to greater exceſs than that which is perpetrated under the name of benevolence, becauſe the merit of the motive is made an excuſe for the villany of the means. But, ſecondly, if Great Britain takes up this pretence herſelf, ſhe authoriſes it in others, and Auſtria and Pruſſia may then abuſe the precedent in its wideſt latitude, and yet in exact proportion as Auſtria and Pruſſia have it in their power to commit abuſes, ſo in the ſame proportion ſhould we avoid furniſhing them with any warrant for it. What will not Auſtria ſay to us, who have been the habitual rivals of France, if we pretend to regulate the government of France, and play the part of an *amicus curiæ*; and forbid the like indulgence to Auſtria; to Auſtria, the ally of the Monarchy of France, the power which is *principal in the war*, and which has a family motive for reſtoring a prince born from one of its own relations; and if for reſtoring the prince, by a like reaſon intereſted to provide for his future ſecurity. If we wiſh here to know what the idea of Auſtria is, as to the meaſure of government now proper for France, and for maintaining the permanency of that meaſure, it may be ſeen from the Duke of Brunſwick's Maniſeſto; the object of which (as ſeparate from its menaces, and as never yet contradicted, except for the artful and deteſtable purpoſes of the *moment*) is this—France muſt be governed by the will of *one* man, aided or not by counſellors as he *alone* ſhall think proper; and every man who ſhall be found to have contravened this ought to meet exemplary puniſhment. To this language Pruſſia has done more than ſubſcribed, for ſhe has impriſoned in a cruel manner La Fayette, for having dared to oppoſe arbitrary power in France, though he was the very man who prevented the inſtitution of a Republic upon the King's abſconding in June 1791, when multitudes of the *Ariſtocracy* would willingly have concurred in it; and ſhe has moreover herſelf exhibited the parallel to that ſpecies of government in Pruſſia, and in the purſuit

purſuit of her double partition of Poland. But if ſuch a reſtoration, and ſuch a government, ſhall actually take place in France, ſhall not we have to fear a cloſe connexion between the Auſtrian and Bourbon houſes, far more formidable than the late family-compact, and to which it is eaſy for Pruſſia and Ruſſia to become leagued? The Confederates, I know, will willingly compliment Great Britain with being the firſt in the field; but will ſhe not be made the laſt in the cabinet the moment ſhe wiſhes for peace upon any terms hoſtile to ſuch a combination? Conſequently, both principle and policy recommend that we ſhould ſuffer France to remain independent under her own government, rather than allied to foreign powers under a preſcribed one; and that we ſhould not work our own ruin in the face of juſtice.

As to the pretence, that one portion of a nation may invite foreigners to act againſt the other portion of it, I anſwer, that *primâ facie*, the neceſſity of calling in ſuch aid, implies a weakneſs in thoſe who invoke the aid, which argues, that they are themſelves the *minority*. Next, the fable of the horſe, inviting the ſuccour of the man againſt the ſtag, ſhews the danger of ſuch an alliance ultimately to *both* parts of a nation. Or, if we wiſh to ſee the ſame fact illuſtrated without the help of fable, let us obſerve the conduct of Auſtria and Pruſſia towards the French emigrants, whoſe ſufferings they overlook, and whoſe co-operation they ſcorn, doubtleſs, becauſe meaning to *plunder* France, and to give it a government according to their *own* pleaſure, they do not chuſe to ſeem to be under any obligation to the emigrants. And if, in reply to this it be ſaid, that the emigrants have behaved ill, does not this, if true, furniſh a new proof of the impropriety of foreign interference, even upon a partial invitation, ſince the inviters, beſides forming the minority of a nation, may alſo, by the very hypotheſis, be deſtitute of the claim of merit.

SEC.

SECTION V.

EACH NATION HAS THE SOLE RIGHT OF GOVERNING ITSELF, THAT IS, TO ESTABLISH AND REGULATE ITS OWN CONSTITUTION.

IN order to prove (for Mr. Burke has put us under the ſtrange neceſſity of proving it) that there is no criminality in the poſition, that a nation, in caſe of neceſſity, may riſe as well to *aſſert*, as to *defend* its rights, I ſhall again appeal to the circumſtances of private life, as the beſt means of reſtoring us to our natural ſentiments upon this ſubject, ſhould either ſophiſtry, habit, or paſſion, have perverted them.

If twenty-ſix men of different nations then are ſhipwrecked upon a deſert iſland, they agree upon their laws, and elect their chiefs. Now what is to preclude the like conſent if the number is twenty-ſix millions? If *force* is employed, force may at any time undo its own work.

But theſe twenty-ſix millions forming a nation had *forefathers*, it is ſaid, who eſtabliſhed a government. Be it ſo, and they did right for themſelves; but can this conſtrain their ſucceſſors? Did they take a bond from their children as the condition of their birth, that they ſhould have no other will but theirs? Did they not rather become fathers in conſequence of a great law of nature, and having thus left behind them their *own likeneſs*, may not theſe, with reſpect to government, do what their fathers did before them? Look at other animals; they abandon their young when capable of their own care, mere parentage with them conveying no rights whatever. With men, indeed, parental protection is more prolonged, but their offſpring *repay* this favour, not only to their own parents, in their ſecond childhood of old age, but to their own iſſue. If their young are

farther

farther protected by a civil government, this benefit is clearly owing from the adult, to all to whom they give exiſtence, though it is a duty fulfilled *in the way which beſt pleaſes them*; and which having been fulfilled to them by their anceſtors, will be fulfilled to themſelves again by their deſcendants when their life declines. Thus, there is a *chain* of *juſtice* deſcending from father to ſon, where good offices are continually received and repaid, but often with a difference of perſons. But no new duty is created thereby as to *civil government*, except that each generation ought to act therein for the beſt, according to its *own* judgment. Agriculture, navigation, war, phyſic, and other arts and ſciences, have their ſyſtems changed at pleaſure, and why not the art of government? We notoriouſly change our municipal law alſo; and what is a conſtitution but municipal law in a larger ſenſe, or, in other words, that leading law under which other laws are framed and executed? The objection to altering a conſtitution is not ſo much, leſt it ſhould be done improperly, but leſt quarrels ſhould thence enſue, and leſt the *general obedience to civil government* ſhould be ſhaken. Thus France, in changing its government, has given a general convulſion to Europe, merely becauſe multitudes have been intereſted in the continuance of its abuſes; for whenever governments are naturely conſtituted, ſuch undertakings are accompliſhed without inconvenience. Events of this ſort, for example, create ſo little ſenſation in North America, as ſcarcely to be noticed out of their reſpective States, though ſeveral of them have periodical reviſions of their conſtitutions appointed, their *conventions* ſitting at the very ſame inſtant with their *legiſlatures*. The preſent queſtion, however, in France, is not whether the nation ſhall diſſolve an old government in order to form a new one; but when an old government is actually diſſolved, and its return impracticable unleſs by force, how to proceed in replacing it.

But we have hitherto ſuppoſed, that an eſtabliſhed government has been *matter of choice* in ancient times: whereas it has been, in general, matter of force and neceſſity. Is poſterity then in its endleſs generation ſervilely to copy thoſe who have ſervilely been made to ſet an example? Are they to adhere to the

government, not of their forefathers, but of thoſe who enſlaved their forefathers? All men once were entitled to be free, becauſe all poſſeſſed equal rights from nature; ſo that innovations are *originally* to be attributed to tyrants, that is, they have come from thoſe who have *perverted* civil government, and not from thoſe who have been made to yield to this perverſion, to a degree ſufficient to enſlave their minds equally with their bodies. This is not merely theoretical reaſoning in the caſe of the French; for hiſtory tells us, that the French are a nation deſcended either from free men or from ſlaves; conſequently the deſcendants of the free have ſtill a claim to freedom as an inheritance; and the enſlaved may avail themſelves of the ſame force, to aſſert a right, which others have employed againſt their fathers and themſelves, to inflict a wrong.

But if old governments have no preponderating claim on account of their antiquity, or of the force which eſtabliſhed them, ſo neither have they in general, upon account of any *wiſdom* ſhewn in their conſtruction. In moſt of the ſtates of Europe, their original governments were formed when their legiſlators could neither *read* nor *write*, when the works alſo of the elder ancients literally lay buried in duſt; when hiſtory, art and ſcience were alike unknown or unnoticed, and when conqueſts alſo were much in faſhion. In ſhort, theſe governments in general were fixed when legiſlators poſſeſſed neither lights nor experience themſelves, nor derived any from others; when the few lorded it over the many, and force ſtood in lieu of right. The reſult, as might have been expected, was, that *injuſtice*, *ignorance*, *wars*, and *intolerance*, have been univerſal; and a lapſe of ten centuries witneſſed fewer improvements than receive birth in ten years in modern times, in conſequence of *diviating* from that very ſyſtem of antiquity which it is propoſed that Europe in general ſhall retain. Notwithſtanding the bigotted wiſh of the barons of England (*nolumus leges Angliæ mutari*), ſcarcely a ſhred of *Magna Charta*, or even of the Bill of Rights, is at preſent looked to in practice; villenage is extinct, moſt of the feudal rights of the crown, and of others, are commuted; pecuniary compenſation for crimes ſubſiſts only in a trifling degree;

degree; and the eyes of the Britiſh nation have opened to various other faults of the feudal ſyſtem; a ſyſtem, which in truth never had any peculiar merit to boaſt, but the introduction of ſomething like a plan of *legiſlative repreſentation*, and of a *reſpect for women*. In France, at the time of the revolution, many feudal evils exiſted in their original extent, and if the crown and ariſtocracy had ſeemed to correct ſome of them in their mode of adminiſtering them, yet it was not in a degree ſufficient to keep pace with that bleſſing of modern times the *public opinion*. In ſhort, ſo little reaſon is there to reſpect the ſenſe, or the juſtice of the ancients, in matters of government, that there are few perſons of education of the preſent day, whatever be their talents, if they have but an honeſt mind, who are not better qualified to delineate the plan of a good conſtitution for a *new* people than any legiſlator of antiquity, whether taken on this or the other ſide of the Chriſtian æra; becauſe a modern legiſlator, with *good intentions*, would proceed upon four data, which would remedy every leſſer error, namely, general juſtice, a fair repreſentation, œconomy, and ſimplicity. The only proper terror therefore attending the reforms of the preſent age are, leſt they ſhould be unneceſſarily precipitate, for if gradual, time will ſoon produce a *mutual* conſent in their favour; and when once effected, they will be for the acknowledged intereſt of every order, from the higheſt to the loweſt.

But we have ſtill another proof that men poſſeſs a right to change their governments from time to time, founded upon the fact, that all governments are, in many reſpects, *liable to be changed involuntarily*. This may occur, not only from their internal corruption, which is ſometimes in proportion to their degree of original perfection, but likewiſe from alterations which take place, either in men or in their circumſtances. Thus, in a government, which in its primary ſtate perhaps may have ſtood exactly balanced, if the merit of any degraded claſs of men becomes newly acknowledged (as that of perſons without franchiſes in corporations), or if rights have unwiſely been made local where the ſcene of population has afterwards ſhifted itſelf, or if dominions have become ſubſequently either enlarged

or diminiſhed: in theſe, and ſimilar inſtances, the living are clearly not to omit accommodating their government to the actual poſition of the day, becauſe the dead had the ſuppoſed merit of ſuiting *their* government to the particular times in which they lived. In like manner, when the domeſtic effects of conqueſt diſappear any where, it is ſurely time to remove all political differences ſubſiſting between the vanquiſhed and their maſters; and by conſequence, the feudal ſyſtem ought now every where immediately to be aboliſhed, as injuring both the public and the proprietors in it; for though it *originated* from ſyſtem of conqueſt, and of perſonal military ſervice, yet not only the practice, but the very memory of both are now in general wholly obliterated, except in hiſtory and law books.

Since political wiſdom then muſt thus neceſſarily be *relative*, becauſe man and his affairs are given to change, by what cauſe is it that diſcuſſion and experience, which are ſo ſerviceable in other caſes, are to be uſeleſs with an object ſo varying as that of government? By what curious felicity is it, that the framers of a given government can have ſelected a form, not only the beſt poſſible for their *own* time, but even for *every other?* Inſtead of ſelection, however, it is known that accident has been the parent of moſt governments; or elſe the will of a *few*, who deſigned to ſerve themſelves only, and not the public.

But there is one argument upon the ſubject of changes in government, which is perfectly *ad hominem*, and therefore incontrovertible by our opponents, which is, that various much-applauded governments are in themſelves *the acknowledged fruit of revolution*. Thus in England, two kings were dethroned within a ſpace of fifty years, and one of them executed, before we attained that revolution in which we glory; and lawyers, like Judge Blackſtone, gravely confeſs, that if a revolution ſhould return in this country, with the *preciſe circumſtances* attending that in queſtion, ſuch a revolution would be warranted even by *law*. It is not a century ſince a revolution was made in the government of Scotland, by its union with England; and Ireland has lately undergone material variations, and has ſtill others to experience.

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What European government, indeed, of any conſequence, can fairly boaſt of much antiquity, beſides the Venetian, of which (ſince I am forced to obſerve upon it) the very antiquity is a reproach to human nature? for it exhibits a metropolis, which, in order to domineer over a large tract of *country*, takes part with one claſs of the country-inhabitants againſt the other; while its policy, with reſpect to the people of the *capital*, is either to faſcinate them by amuſements and debauchery, or elſe to awe them by a police, depending chiefly upon informers or aſſaſſins: this vaunted republic having for its chief merit the talent of perpetuating its own miſchiefs. How ſingular then is it for any to affirm, that we are to ſubmit to whatever government is *once eſtabliſhed*, though eſtabliſhed by tyrants; and therefore, ſince tyranny, in a given period, is likely to have its turn in every country, and when once in exiſtence is, by the hypotheſis, to be made immortal, that tyranny muſt in time overſhadow the whole globe, and blacken the fate of all mankind. If this doctrine be thought too revolting for our ſenſe and patience, where is the exception to it? If there is any, it muſt be this, that every government may be changed at all times by a majority (of a certain deſcription) of thoſe to whom it relates; and if this exception be admitted, the exception is large and honeſt enough wholly to deſtroy a rule ſo deteſtable.

The objection to alterations in political government, drawn from the evils attending the practical eſtabliſhment of thoſe alterations, has already been in part noticed, but requires to be farther ſlightly mentioned; for to *what* are thoſe evils generally owing? Surely not neceſſarily to the public, when making a demand of their rights, but commonly to thoſe who reſiſt the conceſſion of theſe rights. To borrow the phraſe of the vulgar, it is the *ſecond* blow which makes the ſtruggle. Why then are we to "refuſe paying to a creditor the hundred pounds "we owe him, becauſe he may claim another hundred to "which he has no title." Is not this to commit an *actual* injuſtice in our own perſons, from the fear of experiencing a *poſſible* injuſtice from others? And is not the denial the more remarkable, as the beſt hope which prudent men ought to entertain

tain of ſaving a valuable reſidue of their preſent privileges, is fairly to ſurrender a certain uſeleſs portion of them at a period when they can command *a liberal commutation for the ſacrifice*.

Theſe opinions form a medium between thoſe of Mr. Burke and Mr. Paine, as I ſhall prove by a ſhort criticiſm upon each of theſe authors.

SECTION VI.

CRITICISM ON CERTAIN DOCTRINES OF MR. PAINE.

AS to the *revolutionary* doctrines of Mr. Paine (for it is not my province here to examine his general notions of government), I muſt obſerve, that when he ſays that the Britiſh nation has no conſtitution, he means, that it has had no *convention*, that is, none founded upon a direct and univerſal repreſentation. A conſtitution, however, ſimply means that ſyſtem by which the ordinary governing powers of a nation are themſelves confeſſedly regulated; and it is plain, that we have a conſtitution in this ſenſe, notwithſtanding (as in the caſe of the Engliſh *common* law) a part of it is unwritten. To ſay at any time that our conſtitution is endangered or perverted, is at once to admit that it has an eſſence, though the beſt proof of its being and vitality lies in the conſenting feelings of the nation. Without troubling myſelf therefore with a ſearch how our conſtitution *originated*, or even what is its *nature* or its *merit*, I content myſelf with the aſſurance that it *exiſts*, and has obtained the ſucceſſive acquieſcence of the people from one generation to another.

A language like this does not prevent either a reſolute defence of that conſtitution, or a reform; for it does not even preclude a revolution, which no one, however, more than myſelf

ſelf can deprecate, unleſs under the moſt peculiar circumſtances. It clearly acknowledges, that the people (or nation) are the ultimate maſters; but it implies alſo, that they have already adopted a conſtitution by which they are to remain bound *for ever*, till they approve of a variation; I ſay for ever, becauſe ſome government muſt always exiſt, and therefore that which is already eſtabliſhed, muſt *unceaſingly* exiſt till a change occurs; the moment of which being indefinite, is not willingly to be pre-ſuppoſed. If a nation indeed appoints expreſs periods for the reviſion of its government, ſuch a proviſion will then form a part of *its conſtitution*; but ſuch a proviſion is not yet a part of *our's*; and in any event, it is more requiſite in the infancy of a conſtitution, when experience has not had time to furniſh its evidence, upon the ſubject, than in its more advanced periods. In great concerns, indeed, certitude and tranquility are ſo preferable to hazard and tumult, and to ameliorate is ſo much better than to form anew, that we may even be chearfully reconciled to what (ſingular as it may ſeem) is certainly a part of our own conſtitution, namely, that a power of making eſſential changes in it ſhould reſide in the *ordinary* legiſlature; eſpecially of making ſuch changes as relate to the reſcinding of its own innovations, or to the carrying into better effect the ſpirit of the conſtitution; and eſpecially too, in a country where conventions are ſo little habitual, as to be likely to cauſe conſiderable ferment ſhould they occur.

If the people are properly enlightened and independent, alterations which are good will be obtained in this manner at little riſque, and bad ones will eaſily be prevented, or elſe be ſpeedily redreſſed; and if the people are not thus enlightened and independent, they are ſcarcely fit for appearing in a convention. Can any man of judgment or of feeling indeed be fond of encouraging *revolutions*, by which a nation is toſſed off its baſe into the air, without its being certain which ſide will be left uppermoſt when it falls back again? Is the mere call of a theoriſt to lead this nation to hazard the *much*, which it enjoys in peace, for a ſmall addition, which it can probably only obtain by blood, even if it obtains it at all, but which it

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may ſhed its blood without obtaining? The dog who dropped the ſubſtance to bite at the ſhadow, experienced only the loſs of that ſubſtance; but a nation, in the ſituation here painted, might not only experience temporary loſs, but dreadful *injury*.

What is the attempt at a revolution? Is it not a ſtate-battle, in which, ſhould the people be conquered, the conqueror will act upon the ſyſtem of conqueſt; is it not an inter-regnum even in caſe of their being ſuperior, in which they may afterwards have to ſtruggle with the villany or ignorance of their own chiefs and ſupporters; and is it not a moment, in which foreigners may intrude as enemies into their government, or as rivals into their concerns, in which the minds of men may become embittered, families be divided, friends ſpill the blood, or plot the ruin of friends, and private duties of all ſorts be found in contention with public ones; trade alſo ſtagnate, credit vaniſh, and perhaps the fields be untilled, and the induſtry, morals, and humanity of the people become impaired? If it is a caſe in which there is *much* change called for, an oppreſſed people may indeed ſhew zeal, but will probably want temper and inſtruction; and if there is little required to be done, why call in a tempeſt to effect it? If the parties mean the bleſſing for their *own* day, alas, it may be dearly bought; and if for poſterity, it will be equally in time for them if it can be effected through the channel of a mild and generous reform, which profeſſes to retain all which is good, and to remove only what is bad; which aſſumes inſtantly what is practicable, and prepares the way for what is difficult; and which, by a juſt or indulgent proviſion for the incumbent, facilitates a more happy, as well as a more certain termination of every abuſe.

Should the preſent ſtruggle for example, on the ſide of France iſſue proſperouſly, has not its war, and have not indeed its mere armaments againſt its external and internal enemies, coſt it millions upon millions more than its *plunder* has produced to it; and if its ſtruggle ultimately fails, will not France have loſt all merely from wanting ſenſe and moderation? In arbitrary governments, ſuch as was that of France under its monarchy, or in deſpotic governments, like that of Turkey, attempts at revolu-

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tions may often be plauſible, and when plauſible, will be juſtifiable, becauſe the provocation is always ſufficient, and things can hardly be made worſe by an attempt failing. But in a country, like England, which has a *quiet* means of reform open to it, and which, if it could accompliſh a Revolution, would have little to gain, becauſe it has comparatively little to alter; and becauſe that little muſt be effected with wiſdom and with lenity; I ſay, in England, the attempt at a revolution, unleſs under very extraordinary circumſtances, and with a view to *preſerve* rather than to improve, would be madneſs; and the propoſition to that effect deſerving of every degree of reprobation and horror. But were it otherwiſe, revolutions do not require to be *preached*; for when they are practicable, the people will ſhew, in a manner too marked to be miſtaken, whether they are ripe or not for joining in them; and the meaſures of the times in this reſpect will of themſelves be *up to the times*. To aim, therefore, at revolutions, either needleſsly or prematurely, is an act of high imprudence, and even of injuſtice; for though friendly to free diſcuſſions, and convinced of the fair meaning of many of Mr. Paine's admirers, yet I muſt affirm, that certain parts of his writings have done great immediate miſchief to the cauſe of Liberty, and to its ſupporters, from having occaſioned a poſtponement of the great work of reform, and great unhappineſs to many individuals. In ſhort, one of the moſt potent motives for a *reform* is, that it may extinguiſh that leaven, which at one period or another may generate a *Revolution*; a remedy too deſperate ever to be applied, except when the diſeaſe is ſtill more deſperate than itſelf; that is, only when real ſlavery oppreſſes or threatens. The love of change is an embarraſſing paſſion, often fatal to its poſſeſſors; and as there are few changes good which are not gradual, "the fearleſs great reſolve" ought to be left to the romance of the poets, and to be replaced by that better quality, ſo happily marked by the name of "an intrepid moderation," which, while with firmneſs it chooſes a line of caution, with equal firmneſs executes whatever it has determined.

SECTION VII.

CRITICISM ON CERTAIN DOCTRINES OF MR. BURKE; WITH REMARKS ON HIS NOTED PHRASE OF THE "SWINISH MULTITUDE."

I Deſign neither to praiſe nor to cenſure Mr. Burke, my concern being with his theories. Having endeavoured to overthrow his anti-revolutionary ſyſtem, I ſhall here ſeek to diſſipate the very materials of his edifice. Surrounded as it is by a thicket of metaphyſics, it is difficult to find an approach to it; but in this, however, lies our only difficulty. To remove that difficulty, I ſhall tranſlate his metaphyſics into plainer language. Where eloquence furniſhes the glaſs through which we are to view an object, however hideous and deformed that object may be in its native characters, it is eaſy by this means to diſguiſe its outlines, and to decorate every part of it with falſe priſmatic colours; and the only remedy conſiſts in withdrawing from before the eye the deceitful medium, and truſting to daylight and our ſenſes. It is thus that we ſhall proceed with Mr. Burke; rendering the ſubject as little abſtruce, as its nature and his mode of treating it will admit. But I muſt premiſe, that I ſhall anſwer no more of Mr. Burke than can be conſidered as adverſe to my own propoſitious.

To alter a conſtitution once ſettled upon compact, whether tacit or expreſs, without the conſent of all the parties, ſays Mr. Burke, is to break that compact. But may not a compact be *obligatory during its exiſtence*, and yet at the ſame time be *diſſoluble for urgent reaſons*. For example, if I apply to a phyſician to take charge of my health, under a general engagement on my ſide to conform to his preſcriptions, does it follow, that I can never change this phyſician for negligence; or does the contract imply, even while we remain together, that I muſt never

never decline his preſcriptions when notoriouſly injurious, of which the patient ſurely is but to feeling a judge?

But our author goes further; for he ſays, that though civil ſociety might be at firſt a *voluntary* act, it is continued down under a permanent covenant, attaching upon every new individual without any *formal act of his own*. His proof of this is, that men come into the community partaking conjointly of its benefits and of its duties; and that, duty being always compulſive, *duty* and *will* are contradictory terms; (the compulſion, in the caſe in queſtion ariſing, he ſays, from the relations of man to man, and of man to God, which are plainly *not matters of choice.*)—Thus, then, we have our author's ſyſtem extended againſt us, not only for life, but even from generation to generation; and thence, to go back to our illuſtration, we are to conclude, that children muſt ſubmit through endleſs time to the medical government of ſome certain perſons, merely becauſe theſe happen to be deſcended from their father's phyſician. But let us obſerve here, as being curious in Mr. Burke's reaſoning, that mention is made only of the duty attaching to *one* party in the political compact, namely, the people; notwithſtanding political governors have at leaſt as much duty to fulfil as the people. If theſe governors, when they commit exceſſive wrongs, ſhould be thought, for cogent reaſons, to be *inviolable*; yet ſurely it does not follow, that they are never to be *removeable*; or that their high and important duties are to be left without any correſponding ſanction for enforcing them; (eſpecially as a part of the crime of the government may have conſiſted, in depriving the people of the means of fulfilling its portion of the compact.)—But in the next place, let me aſk, what becomes of Mr. Burke's hypotheſis, in caſes where there is no compact, and where the conſtitution is neither wiſe nor juſt, or elſe has been perverted, or laſtly, has failed in gaining the general approbation? Where is its obligation under ſuch circumſtances? Is there any thing in a nation, either greater or more important, than the whole nation itſelf; and ſhall the nation bow down before an idol, which is *not* of its own making. Should any one here proceed in error, ſtill farther than Mr. Burke, and affirm,

that compact and juſtice are wholly out of the queſtion, and that government belongs only to the ſtrongeſt; this is to put the matter at iſſue upon the queſtion of *force*; and mankind have ſolely to conſult their prudence as to the *time* of reviving this conteſt, in caſes where the government which is impoſed is bad. I ſhall not particularly reply in this place to what Mr. Burke ſays of the true baſis of government, of its benefits, or of its duties; having already diſcuſſed theſe queſtions. But I think it neceſſary to add, that when, inſtead of *benefits*, a government ſhall have inflicted *curſes*, a nation ſeems then to be permitted by the tenor of this part of Mr. Burke's own hypotheſis, to inſtitute a better government; and when inſtituted, it will, I hope, under every hypotheſis, be held a duty to hand it unimpaired to poſterity; a duty, which we find from hiſtory, has been acknowledged by all nations in critical circumſtances.—As to Mr. Burke's grave appeal to the duty owing "from man "to man, and from all men to God," it is clear, that this appeal takes the whole of this diſcuſſion *for granted*; and that if theſe duties are proved to operate on *my* ſide of the queſtion, inſtead of Mr. Burke's, I ſhall myſelf be intitled by virtue of his own reaſonings, to the benefit of ſuch appeal, in favour of my own poſitions. Let the reader therefore conſider this ſubject, either with a view to duty or to happineſs, to theory or to practice (which in large objects often come to the ſame thing); and decide the conteſt.

The next poſition of Mr. Burke, I confeſs, ſurpriſes me.—Wiſhing to deny, that the baſis of government depends upon the *majority*, he ſays, that a people being but a corporation, when they break the compact which gives them a corporate form, they are no longer a *people*; and that among diſbanded men, no *majority* can operate, ſince one man cannot bind *another*. It is ſingular, that a perſon who thus calls for *unanimity*, in a ſtate of nature, ſhould make numbers paſs for ſo little in a ſtate of ſociety. But he forgets, that this diſbanded body is not more diſbanded than it was *previous* to the preſent ſtate of ſociety; and that it is difficult to prove, that the diſſolved compact was *itſelf* originally formed, in conſequence of any unanimity.

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As to majorities, the neceſſity of reſorting to them, ariſes from the moral impoſſibility of obtaining a frequent unanimity; ſo that if the ſociety has to *decide* upon various queſtions, a deciſion cannot be had, without the means of deciſion are given, namely, the voice of a majority; which majority may, at pleaſure, fix its *own quantum*, in all ſubſequent queſtions.

But Mr. Burke, who will not allow of majorities, nevertheleſs allows of caſts and privileged characters, under the name of a *natural* ariſtocracy; in great multitudes of whom, acting together, he recognizes the *people*; without whom (that is, without which portion of the people), he apparently admits neither influence nor contravention to exiſt, on the part of the public, in matters of government, (even if he admits it then).—I muſt here obſerve, that Mr. Burke's natural ariſtocracy wholly excludes that claſs of men, who, without being able to take part in public affairs themſelves, yet can appreciate characters ſufficiently well to appoint repreſentatives to act for them; and this I conſider as a ſufficient anſwer to his hypotheſis on this ſubject, even if it did not exclude many of thoſe who can judge for themſelves.

Here then for a while quitting this writer, let me revert to that momentous queſtion, whether the natural rights of man (as they are called) are at any time to ſtand compromized and affected by incidental circumſtances? I anſwer boldly, that they are; for firſt, large and extenſive concerns, in proportion to their magnitude, have a claim to be ſeparated from more general rules, and to be conſidered as diſtinct caſes, and to be decided upon as ſuch according to their own bearings and operations; and in the next place, I take the firſt *right of man* to be, *that of being as happy as poſſible, conſiſtently with the ſame right in other men*; (every other right being ſubordinate to this leading right, and ſerving only as a *means* to this end.) In the vaſt ſyſtem of ſociety, therefore, if it ſhould happen, that a large deſcription of men ſhould be found below that temperament, either of virtue or of knowledge, which is neceſſary to enable them to aſſiſt, either directly or indirectly, in judging of the general welfare; the happineſs of the whole will require the

excluſion

exclusion of such portion from all interference in politics, (at least unless in particular cases;) an exclusion, which, though it is much to be lamented, and as soon as possible to be terminated, yet is, with respect to all good purposes, only nominal; since the *exercise* of a faculty of judging is only denied to those who really are destitute of the faculty itself.

In a state of nature, then, and preparatory to forming a convention, men may be ranged into three classes, with respect to politics, namely, those who can judge for themselves, those who can find others to judge for them, and those who can do neither properly. Delegation (which is necessary both upon a *mechanical* principle for numerous bodies, and also to impart in the present instance the means of action to the middle class) mixes the first and second class into one, and thus secures the co-operation of the greatest possible portion of the society. I see no other procedure than this to be pursued in those states, which pretend to the freest systems of representation; and in all other states, great as is the blessing of a free representation, it ought at first, like light and food to men who have been famished in dungeons, to be charily administered. Thus we see, that our chief and prominent political right is, that we should be happy; that education is a great instrument in forming our characters; that the desideratum of all societies ought to be, to impart rights and blessings to the greatest number; that acting by delegation and by majorities, are necessary mechanical expedients; and that since a *minority* must exist in all societies, instead of attempting to lessen the numbers of it by persecution, the ease of this minority ought to be consulted by every indulgence, as the best consolation for the necessity of subjecting it to general laws. Shall a disciple of Mr. Burke, after allowing the original insufficiency of one man to bind another by the means of the voice of a *majority*, contend for the competence of one primary vote of unanimity, given only by hypothesis, confirmed only by mere majorities since the flood by a like hypothesis, passed, perhaps, with the crudeness or violence of a French decree, and in any event incroached upon by such numberless innovations, that, contrary to the ship of Delos, it no

longer

longer admits a ſcholaſtic queſtion, whether its identity and continuity is not long ſince utterly vaniſhed ; I ſay, ſhall a diſciple of Mr. Burke (even ſhould his maſter refuſe ſuch a boon of juſtice), view with any other ſentiment than that of tenderneſs, all modern aberrations from unanimity, whether in church or ſtate, and contend, that governments ought to be conducted upon a principle of excluſion, rather than that of comprehenſion ?— So much then muſt ſuffice for general notions on the ſubject of Revolutions, as far as thoſe of Mr. Burke and myſelf ſtand in contradiction; referring to Mr. Burke's *Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs*, as his lateſt exhibition of his own.

In ſpeaking of Mr. Burke's noted phraſe of the "*ſwiniſh multitude*," uſed in a former publication, it is with reluctance I obſerve, that a diſdain of the poor is generally accompanied with a diſpoſition to applaud the great. But if the poor are really of the deſcription of ſwine, the ſpell of the enchantreſs, Circe, which has been potent enough to effect it, I ſay, this ſpell conſiſts only of ignorance and vice ; and the ſole mode of removing their beſtiality, and to make them fit companions again for the too contemptuous Ulyſſes, is to communicate to them knowledge and virtue. The poor, lured by ſpecious pretexts and promiſes, have been deceived into their preſent odious ſituation.

On thrones around, with downy coverings grac'd,
With *ſemblance fair*, th' unhappy men ſhe plac'd.
But venom'd was the bread, and mix'd the bowl,
With drugs of force to *darken* all the ſoul :
Soon in the luſcious feaſt themſelves they loſt,
And drank oblivion of their native coaſt.
Inſtant her circling wand the goddeſs waves,
To hogs transforms them—and the ſty receives.
No more was ſeen the human form divine ;
Head, face, and members, briſtle into ſwine :
Still curſt with ſenſe, their *minds* remain alone,
And their own voice affrights them when they groan.

Meanwhile

Meanwhile the goddeſs, in diſdain, beſtows
The maſt and acorn, *(brutal food!)* and ſtrows
The fruits of cornel, as their feaſt around.
—Think'ſt thou by wit to model their eſcape?
Sooner ſhalt thou, a ſtranger to thy ſhape,
Fall prone, their equal. Firſt, thy danger know;
Then, take the antidote the gods beſtow;
And haſtening to the ſties, ſet wide the door,
Urge forth and drive the briſtly herd before.
—Unweildy, out they ruſh with general cry,
Enormous beaſts, diſhoneſt to the eye.
Now touch'd with counter-charms, they change again,
And ſtand *majeſtic*, and recall'd to *men*.
Thoſe hairs, of late that briſtled every part,
Fall off, miraculous effect of art!
Till all the form in full proportion riſe,
More young, more large, more graceful to our eyes.

For myſelf (who *nihil humanùm a me alienum puto*), I am thoroughly convinced with Rouſſeau, that if *men* are bad, *man* himſelf is good; or at leaſt, which is the ſenſe in which I accept the poſition, capable of being rendered ſo by education and care. It is indeed a ſort of begging of the principle, firſt to neglect the poor, and then to ſay, that they are too bad either for truſt or for enjoyment; and that therefore we muſt not throw our pearls before them. But the poet tells us, that this is the natural progreſs of the paſſions: odi *profanum* vulgus, et *arceo*.—In contemplating however the *broad pyramid*, which (according to every one), repreſents ſociety in its actual ſtate, I conceive, that thoſe who form the lower portions of it, may, in conſequence of the power of *knowledge* to direct, of *mechanics* to aid, of *œconomy* to ſpare, and of *peace* to protect; I conceive, I ſay, that the poor may eaſily have their labours leſſened, their comforts increaſed, and their gratifications extended beyond their preſent meaſure, without either loſs, riſque, or inconvenience to the opulent; and the more ſo, in proportion to their education. Is it not a general ſcandal, that the chief conſola-

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tion of the poor, in moſt countries, is liquor; and that nothing is thought ſo dreadful, as to let them retain any time at their command; though, when men are rendered innocent by education, what can be a more obvious or cheaper indulgence to them than *leiſure*?—Oh! hiſtory, unfold thy pages, reddened with blood, and blackened with crimes, and tell us, why it is, that our rulers *waſte* the labour of man by wars, and neglect his education. Is it becauſe, if they improved mankind, they muſt improve themſelves? After all that we have ſuffered, on account of their ambition, are they yet then to learn, firſt, how little wars add to their felicity; and next, that we, their ſubjects, are always too happy, when they purſue merely a *negative* conduct.

SECTION VIII.

ON THE PRESENT PERSECUTIONS AGAINST POPULAR PRINCIPLES.

I Cannot be deemed to vindicate that ſort of perſecution, which has occurred on this occaſion, againſt popular characters, popular bodies, and popular principles. It will be found a great miſtake, if ſlander is held equal to the work of reaſon; and if railing at an echo, is adopted as the means of ſilencing it; for theſe things may chance to be rendered back with intereſt, ſhould occaſions change. At preſent, apparent proſperity, and the abſence of all ſuſpicion, have tranquillized the public on the ſubject of politics; and while things retain ſuch an aſpect, men may forget the inquiry, whether they have *any fixed political ſecurity for the continuance of it*; but let room once be given, either for uneaſineſs or for jealouſy, and it will then ſoon

appear, whether the mind of man in this country has not abandoned many prejudices, and made a progreſs, which will call for ſtrong grounds of ſatisfaction before things can be calmed again. Fooliſh then are thoſe who place their ſafety on the mere poſture of events, and who feel themſelves ſecure when theſe are proſperous: for prudence requires ſuch a ſtability in every ſituation, that even *adverſe* circumſtances ſhall not injure it. And for this purpoſe, thoſe who are afraid of the progreſs of popular opinions have two meaſures before them, which are perfectly obvious, and both of which at preſent are completely in their power. The one is, to compound with the public for the ſurrender of whatever the public is likely permanently to object to, while (if I may uſe the phraſe with decency) *a good market for it offers*. For example, rotten boroughs and tythes might now be ſure of receiving ample commutation, in conſequence of the eaſy temper and wealth of the public; and the bargain to the public would be cheap at any price; for what is money to a nation, which could ſpend a hundred millions in acknowledged modes in the American war, and as much more in unaccounted modes, or in gains and proſperity which were foregone, during or in conſequence of that war. And as to the Crown, who is it that would not joyfully add to its ſplendor and means of gratification, if we were allowed in return to abate its influence; and having at the ſame time given a certain degree of independence to the Legiſlature, the farther progreſs of the executive power would no longer ſerve for alarm. The ſecond meaſure is, to educate the poor, on whom no other religious principle is ſeriouſly inculcated with a *political* view, than bigotry, or, in other words, than hating their neighbour; and to whom no other mode of carrying their political *wiſhes* into effect is pointed out, than that of violence. Violence has a double edge, which the doctrine of paſſive obedience will not, upon trying occaſions, be able to blunt; and no one can tell who it is five years hence, that will have to wield this formidable weapon. If political objections are thus removed on one ſide, and if the manners of the populace are ſoftened on the other, no popular writer

writer will be able to diſturb our internal peace; liberty will no longer ſeek to build its temple upon the ſands of democracy; nor ambition purſue that deep game of *all or nothing*.

SECTION IX.

ON THE DUKE OF BRUNSWICK'S MANIFESTO.

THE indignation of mankind will at laſt riſe to a pitch which armies cannot quell. The *declaration made by the Duke of Brunſwick*, in the name of Auſtria and Pruſſia againſt France, portends death to all its inhabitants (except regular troops) who offer any obſtacle to their forces.

The political deſigns announced, are to reſtore the French King to *abſolute power*. He is, in more than ten paſſages of a ſhort manifeſto, made the ſole fountain of authority; and the allies expreſsly acknowledge no laws whatever in France, but thoſe flowing from *him*. They ſpeak indeed of his promiſes, in favour of the happineſs of his ſubjects; and ſuppoſe it poſſible that he may convene certain bodies near him; but of what nature, they ſay, depends entirely upon himſelf; adding in another place, that they ſhall not intermeddle in the interior government of France.—Such is their benevolent and philoſophic end.

Their means, which are correſponding, are fire and ſword. If the militia (or national guards) oppoſe them, they are to receive the puniſhment of rebellion; (which is the more remarkable, as half the King of Pruſſia's forces, according to Hertſberg, are of this deſcription). If the inhabitants at large dare defend themſelves, whether in the field, or under cover, they are to ſuffer inſtant military puniſhment, and their houſes to be de-

ſtroyed. The adminiſtrative bodies are made perſonally reſponſible for all violences which they do not notoriouſly oppoſe in their juriſdiction. All the members of the national aſſembly, and of the adminiſtrative bodies and national guard at Paris, are to anſwer with their lives for all accidents to the King, Queen, and royal family; and in caſe of any ſuch accident, or even of the denial of permiſſion to their going where they pleaſe, an exemplary, and never to be forgotten vengeance is to follow, and the city of Paris is to be delivered up to military execution, and even to total ſubverſion.

Of the rights and liberties of citizens, theſe potentates take no concern; for "*ſubjects*," they ſay, "are bound to their ſo-"vereigns by the law of nature and of nations;" of *nature*, though in a ſtate of nature, kings are unknown; and of *nations*, though national law only regulates the concerns between nations. This would be a ſoleciſm therefore in ethics, were correctneſs to be expected from princes, who do not ſtudy the rights of men to preſerve them, but only to know how to controul them. It is another matter alſo of criticiſm, to obſerve tyrants perpetually inſiſting upon the neceſſity of princes being at *liberty*, and of their ſubjects being *diſarmed* before the former can be bound by any oath to any conſtitution; and yet to find them requiring obedience from a nation towards its prince, as of right, though exacted by force from diſarmed and helpleſs citizens. Surely this is ſetting *mutual* compact wholly at defiance, and implying that nations are made for princes, and not princes for nations.

If the French have only awakened from their ſleep of deſpotiſm, in order that after a momentary trance in the arms of liberty, they may again ſink into oppreſſion, loaded with redoubled chains, it is hard to ſay whether they deſerve moſt of contempt, or of pity. France has imbibed ſo much of a ſenſe of liberty, that nothing but a tyranny within, re-inforced by a tyranny from without, can ſeem ſafe or ſatisfactory to thoſe who ſeek to become its maſters.

The diſcontented conſtitutionaliſts are moſt of them *reſpectable, well-intentioned men*; lovers of their country, and capable of ſacrificing their petty wrongs at its ſhrine, as well as of uniting

to

to preſerve it from immediate horrors from without, and of depending with a generous confidence upon the approaching conſtitutional renewal of the legiſlature for redreſs of what is wrong within. The allies, therefore, will be foiled They will, indeed, unite France, but it will be againſt themſelves; they will extinguiſh anarchy, only to revive a conſtitution; and they will reſtore an order to it, which will be oppoſed to their own injuſtice. This is ſure prophecy, for it is the voice of hiſtory.

SECTION X.

PROOFS THAT THE SYSTEM OF PROSELYTISM AND FRATERNITY IS PURSUED BY OLD GOVERNMENTS.

THE late royal compact, ſtiled the *concert of princes*, muſt be admitted to be ſtrictly within our limits; for it originated with the proceedings of France, and has ſince been referred by its authors to thoſe proceedings as one of its chief objects; and indeed a *concerted* operation of ſovereigns which in any ſhape reſpects *domeſtic* tranſactions, muſt neceſſarily imply that ſome of thoſe ſovereigns are bound to intermeddle in given caſes, in the interior of *other* countries. If we are to believe the Emperor of Germany, and the brothers of Louis XVI. this concert was not only open to the acceſſion of different princes, but was actually acceded to by a number of them. But if this be true, in what does it eſſentially differ from the plan of fraternization or interference exhibited by the French, except in having been prior to it, and cauſing the French ſyſtem to be adopted for the purpoſe of countervailing it.

The caſe of *Poland* has, ſome time ſince, furniſhed a notable and undeniable inſtance of confraternity in all its varieties and complications.

complications. After Ruſſia had long endeavoured to fraternize with the Poliſh diffidents (in oppoſition to the very party which ſhe has ſince ſupported), Ruſſia, Auſtria, and Pruſſia, in 1772, coaleſced in brotherly love with one another, in order to cut off three vaſt portions of Poland; and then, upon the ſyſtem of proſelytiſm and fraternization, annexed theſe portions, with equally brotherly love, to their own dominions.

By another act of confraternity between the Republic of Berne, and the Monarchs of France and Sardinia, the Republic of *Geneva* was new modelled.

A like act of confraternity between the Monarch of France and the Republic of *Genoa* enabled the former to buy, and the latter to ſell, *Corſica*.

A ſyſtem of confraternity between certain powers in Europe (firſt inſtigated by the *monarchy* of France), contributed to divide thirteen governments in *North America* from England, and to erect a new Swiſs democratic confederacy in the Weſtern world.

A jumble of heterogenous fraternity between the limited King of England and the Dutch Stadtholder on the one ſide, and the arbitrary Monarch of France and the Dutch popular party on the other ſide, has twice nearly torn Holland into pieces; till Pruſſia at laſt mixed in the proceedings, and gave a forced and temporary unity in favour of the Stadtholder, and thereby furniſhed a precedent, as far as precedent can juſtify it, for the irruption of a brotherly ſwarm of French under Dumourier.

Sweden has been a prey to fraternity in various ſenſes; for firſt the Monarchy of France fraternized with its late King, to enable him to effect a revolution in favour of arbitrary power; and then Ruſſia leagued with the Swediſh *nobles* againſt this King, juſt as ſhe is now fomenting an oppoſition of the *popular party* to the Regent. The late King alſo ſold his brotherly friendſhip both to France and againſt France, to Turkey and againſt Turkey, and firſt oppoſed and then co-operated with Ruſſia; till at laſt, death arreſted him in his project of heading the grand brotherhood of Princes againſt France, his great benefactor and paymaſter.

I will

I will not enlarge reſpecting *Denmark*, where Ruſſian fraternity has long over-ruled the court and the nation; nor on the fraternal revolt excited by Pruſſia in the *Auſtrian Low Countries*; nor on our own deſign of exciting a ſimilar revolt in *Spaniſh America*, had the late rupture with Spain ended in a confirmed war. But caſting our eyes to *infidel* nations (and without noticing any meaſures with the Barbary powers), let us recall to mind the zeal of Ruſſia and Auſtria to make brothers and proſelytes of the *Turks*, by open force; together with the intrigues of the Ruſſians at the Porte, in Egypt, in Perſia, upon the borders of Perſia, and among various Tartan nations and Tribes.—Still more in point are our own proceedings in *India*; where fraternal ſentiments, propagated by the ſword or by bribery, have ſerved in a few years to give us twenty millions of new relations at the diſtance of ten thouſand miles from home.—Extinguiſh Tippoo or extinguiſh France, and in either caſe a turbulent power indeed may fall; but with it will fall the bulwark, which not only virtually defends its weak and neutral neighbours, but even the weaker triumvirs themſelves from the prepollent members of the reſpective triumvirates.

This catalogue of exploits which have taken place towards foreign powers under old eſtabliſhed governments, in which the parties have ſometimes acted conjunctively, and ſometimes ſeparately, commonly for their own intereſt, but occaſionally from pure impartial love for the propagation of arbitrary power; may ſerve to counterbalance the conduct of France, whether ſuppoſed to be directed to ſelfiſh ambition, or to internal interference upon the theoretical principles,

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SECTION XI.

ON THE DEATH OF THE KING OF FRANCE.

IF Louis XVI. while he lived, was wholly neglected by many, who think that hetacombs are neceſſary to expiate his death; it is becauſe the *king* is infinitely more lamented by theſe perſons than the *man*; ſome of them having even wiſhed for his death, that it might increaſe the public enmity againſt *his* opponents, who are conſidered alſo as their *own*. Thus, of all his friends, thoſe of liberty appear the trueſt; ſince from having earneſtly labored to avert his fate, they may be ſuppoſed the moſt ſincerely to regret it.

The attachment of well-informed and virtuous men, to Louis XVI. commenced almoſt with his reign. After the example of his father, the Dauphin, he was early ſaid to reſpect *general* liberty; and if his regard for *religious liberty* did not fully diſcover itſelf till the revolution and till his death, it was becauſe it was checked by his clergy, and by the bigotry of too many of his nation. His ſucceſſive adoption of St. Germain, Turgot, and Necker, as miniſters, on account of their public characters, may be conſidered as a ſolid pledge for the ſincerity of his own; for it will not be contended, that he learned any virtues from his court; a ſchool in which virtues are ſeldom to be found, particularly thoſe of œconomy and retrenchment. It was indeed his peculiar fate to poſſeſs merits which led him to yield to the *faults* of thoſe who ſtood near his perſon, and that while he was deſpiſed for the want of intriguing talents, he was ruined by thoſe who had them; it being clear, that if he had uniformly purſued his own plain ſentiments and ſenſe, he would have remained ſafe upon his throne, an object of adoration. His ſacrifices to his people, as long as they were ſpontaneous, clearly ſhewed his deſire of being

ing united to them, by acts tending to their mutual happineſs; even at a period, when princes in France were held as the proprietors of their ſubjects, and when *merely not to injure them* was conſidered as meritorious. When ſacrifices afterwards came to be demanded from him, no one could more readily acquieſce in them; not becauſe he had no will, but becauſe he had an honeſt one. Indeed, conceſſion ſeldom ſeemed to coſt any thing to himſelf perſonally, except on account of thoſe about him, for when theſe were ſatisfied, all his difficulties ſeemed to vaniſh.

Selfiſh ſentiments had as little ſhare in his foreign, as in his domeſtic politics; for though he employed ſeveral miniſters of the old ſchool, yet ambition never was found the feature of his reign. If he ſought, by the American war and by other meaſures, to reduce the naval power of England, yet the peace of 1782-3 ſhewed, that he aimed at retaining no conqueſts for himſelf. In ſhort, while his was the firſt court, ſince the time of Henry IV. of France, from which a public wiſh for univerſal peace has been heard; ſo there was no public meaſure which any other court could propoſe for the advancement of mankind, in which he was not forward to concur.

Though the mode of thinking of Louis XVI. was thus a powerful ſecond to good miniſters, and a powerful check to bad ones; yet at ſome moments he wanted the firmneſs neceſſary to reſiſt ſeducing importunity, particularly from a certain quarter; and his conduct accordingly became mixed, in proportion as his own feelings, or thoſe of others, bore the aſcendant in it. This very circumſtance, however, in the end, furniſhed a peculiarly ſtrong motive for *protecting his life*, becauſe it prevented his becoming too popular with the nation on one ſide, as well as leſſened the confidence of the ariſtocracy, and of foreign powers in him on the other. He was the leaſt dangerous therefore of all the claimants for reſtoring the throne, eſpecially while confined at Paris; at the ſame time, that his life obſtructed the pretenſions of others of his family, whoſe characters were more deciſive, and who were out of the power of the convention. Beſides, if the revolution in caſe of his execution, was ſo certainly capable (as was pretended), of main-

taining itſelf againſt the reſentment of the whole of Europe, and againſt the feelings of thoſe of the French, who would conſider him as an innocent victim, and even as the object of ſacrilege; the revolution was capable, in caſe he had been ſpared, of the ſtill eaſier taſk, of reſiſting a part of Europe without, and a leſs irritated temper of the enemies to the revolution within.—Yet this amiable prince, whoſe virtues paved the way to the revolution, and formed at firſt its faireſt hope, fell, *without any immediate public motive whatever*, a martyr (as I am willing to allow, in a metaphoric ſenſe), to the madneſs or to the auſterity of ſome, and to the cowardice or the ineffable villany of others.

But feeling, as I do deeply, the truth of theſe ſentiments, ſtill I cannot be blind to ſeveral facts, which go to mitigate them. Firſt, againſt the fatal ſentence in queſtion, nearly one half of the convention was oppoſed; and therefore that intire body is by no means blameable. Next, ſtill leſs did the people partake in this meaſure of violence, for the king's enemies were afraid of appealing to that people. Thirdly, if the trial failed in its obvious forms, yet it muſt be allowed, as in the caſe of Engliſh jurymen, that *perſonal* knowledge was deemed a ſupplementary circumſtance, which enabled the convention to pronounce in it. Laſtly, although the king ſincerely accepted the conſtitution, yet ſince he appears to have afterwards more than negatively oppoſed it, it was unfair to hold the ſingle proviſion for his inviolability as valid, when the ſpirit of all the reſt of it was invaded; for this would be to have put him in a ſituation to profit by his own wrong.

Whether violence to royal perſonages is permiſſible, is uſeleſs for me to inquire, when my ſole object is to prove, that the French have not exceeded others, in the very acts for which it is moſt affected to revile them. To ſay nothing of Ruſſia, and other countries, or even of our own in more ancient periods; it was in England that Henry the Eighth repeatedly beheaded or repeatedly repudiated one Queen, that he might marry another; it was in England, that Elizabeth put to death Mary, the queen of the neighbouring country of Scotland, becauſe ſhe was jealous of her merits; it was here likewiſe, that Charles the

Firſt

Firſt expired upon a ſcaffold; and that James the Second alſo had his vacant throne *aſſumed and maintained againſt him by his own daughter and nephew*; all which tranſactions were included in the ſhort ſpace of two centuries. And when a motion was made a few years ſince in the Houſe of Commons, to expunge the martyrdom of Charles from its calendar (where it has ſince been canonized anew), the reaſon which weighed for retaining it was, that it ſerved as a proper memento both to prince and to people. Beſides, nations like individuals often commit violent acts, of which their repentance is ſincere; though were it otherwiſe, the principles of natural law allow no interference on the part of foreigners to be offered againſt the inclinations of a people. Whatever reſpect therefore kings may deſerve for the ſake of their people, yet ſince in *other* views they are but mere individuals, it is not upon pretences of this ſort, that we are to convert Louis XVI. into a firebrand, and make him "like another Helen, ſerve to fire another Troy."

SECTION XII.

PROOF THAT FRANCE DID NOT DECLARE WAR TILL OBLIGED TO DO SO BY ENGLAND.

IF the French made a law reſpecting paſſports, which affected all citizens, and all aliens among them, without any diſtinctions, we not only made a law which operated againſt aliens ſingly, and was alſo avowedly aimed only againſt aliens of the French nation; but we further violated the commercial treaty, by forbidding, *in the middle of December laſt*, the export even of *foreign* corn to France (though we allowed it to be exported to

other nations); our expreſs motive being, that of checking "an "*enemy* in the act of *hoſtile preparations.*"

The affair of the alien bill, and of foreign corn; our armaments, and eſpecially thoſe by ſea, when we had no maritime enemy to threaten us; our bitter and hoſtile language againſt the French nation; our virtual countenance given to the coalition of princes; our withdrawing our own ambaſſador from France, and expelling theirs from England; our open countenance at the ſame time of *active* French inſurgents; and our marked preference to the cauſe of their king, not only ſince, but long before his death (while we conſtantly pretended *neutrality* as to the internal affairs of France); theſe circumſtances, particularly when viewed conjunctively, were ſtrong ſymptoms of meditated hoſtility. But the hiſtory of the proceedings towards M. Chauvelin complete the demonſtration.

Thoſe who create a juſt *fear* of hoſtilities, and thoſe who refuſe negociation, are the makers of war, and not thoſe who ſimply *declare* it. To terminate peace, is to begin war; for FINIS *coronat opus.*

SECTION XIII.

MOTIVES FOR PEACE; WITH AN ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF GREAT BRITAIN.

I Shall proceed to ſtate the recent declarations made by authority, on the ſubject of the war with France, with a view to follow them with remarks.

The ſpeech of his Majeſty, then, I muſt obſerve, announces no preſent deſign of liſtening to negociation, but ſolely the purſuit of peace through the medium of *war;* it offers no hope even of an *early* iſſue to the conteſt; and it gives the melancholy

choly double notice, that we are to perſevere in vigorous exertions by *land*, and that we are actually embarked in a concert with *foreign* powers. Miniſtry have declared farther, in their parliamentary characters, that any preſent negociation would be impolitic and unſeemly, if not ungrateful, towards the confederates; fraudulent and diſcouraging towards the nation; nugatory in itſelf, from the want of proper organs to conduct it on the ſide of France; and improvident, by betraying our terms at preſent, when ſucceſs may enable us to improve them hereafter. They have ſtated, that war has not yet performed its office upon the French, by producing either terror, ſecurity, or indemnity; that the evils which it is inflicting upon ourſelves, are not of an amount to require its termination; that it is new in politics to ceaſe a defenſive war, merely becauſe an enemy ceaſes his aggreſſion; that if the war is not purſued effectually, at preſent, it may ſoon again return upon us; and that nothing therefore can make peace adviſable under ſuch circumſtances, but neceſſity, or the overthrow of obnoxious perſons or principles in France, or a diminution of the French power, and an increaſe of our own. As to the mode of purſuing the war, it is to be either external or internal; Mr. Burke adding, with the concurrence (as I am informed) of Mr. Pitt, that it is lawful to employ inſurrections, diſſentions, and diſtreſſes in every ſhape; and both of them aſſerting, that it is allowable, if the war gives opportunity, to change the government of France.—I have aimed to make this ſtatement correct, becauſe having to combat the war, and not the miniſtry, it would only be to increaſe my trouble, were I to conjure up phantoms merely to lay them again.

The firſt and moſt natural obſervation here is, that the profeſſed objects of the war are actually obtained, by the ſafety of thoſe allies, of whom the immediate attack was ſolely occaſioned by ourſelves; by the repulſe of the French from all thoſe territories, where alone we originally pretended to dread their eſtabliſhment; by the unanimous repeal of the French decree, reſpecting interference in the interior of foreign countries; and by the demonſtrated nullity of our domeſtic dangers from

French

French intrigues. If we wiſh for farther conceſſions or ſecurity from France, what is more natural (and what more conſiſtent, in the phraſe of Mr. Burke, with "our relation to man and to "God"), than to *demand* ſuch, in the way of negociation; which has a *ſecond* time knocked loudly and uninvited at our doors; and which may be purſued without any relaxation in the immediate operations of the war. Avarice itſelf can offer no objection to this procedure; ſince it is eaſy to ſignify, that the terms to be required now, if refuſed by the French, will hereafter be inhanced, in proportion to our ſubſequent expences and advantages. Does it happen, then, that a ſtill worſe motive, than even *avarice*, precludes negociation; and that we are afraid to diſcloſe the real objects of the war, too *early and diſtinctly* to the Britiſh nation, leſt they ſhould prove too revolting to them?

But the French, it is triumphantly ſaid, are not to be truſted! And who in politics is to be truſted? Shall we aſk Poland, Bavaria, Holland, or Turkey, whether we are to put confidence in *princes?* What are military and naval eſtabliſhments; what is the uſual fate of treaties, which become multiplied from their very fragility; what the applauſe given to conquerors, the cold pity lent to thoſe who are conquered, and the reputed impoſſibility of eſtabliſhing a congreſs to decide national differences by pacific arguments; what are all theſe, I ſay, but ſo many proofs, that faith and juſtice do not inhabit courts? If we allow, therefore, that the French, *like others*, are not to be truſted; ſtill it will not follow, that they are not, like others, to be *negotiated with*. Treaties of peace have other ſanctions beſides integrity. They reſt, for example, upon the calculations of an adverſary, reſpecting the probability of ſucceſs in a war, the comparative coſt of it, and the concurring zeal or obedience of the nation which is to ſupport it. And here let us aſk, whether the *new* government of France, after having ſeated itſelf among the potentates of the earth by an univerſal ratification of its revolution, will be likely to renew the war upon the late frantic plan, which has excited all Europe againſt it, and rendered it impoſſible for it to find an ally? Let us remember again and

again,

again, that one of the chief offences given by the monarchy to France, was its belligerent paſſion; that France, in the early moments of its revolution, was profoundly indifferent to foreign affairs, though inſulted by many, and menaced by all foreign powers; and that it did not invent its ſyſtem of fraternity for the poor ſilly reaſon, that a *tavern meeting had propoſed it*, but to enable it to turn its then *new* conqueſts in the Netherlands to ſome account.

The proſpect was magnificent, and ſeemed feaſible to the enthuſiaſt, of being able to liberate the whole world from bondage; and when ſovereigns had *firſt* concerted a league againſt them, the attack upon ſovereigns ſeemed a meritorious retaliation. But the folly has firſt paſſed away on that ſide, where it was at leaſt the moſt diſintereſted and beſt intended; and if the cruſade *againſt* France has not been abandoned as ſincerely, as the cruſade which it afterwards provoked to iſſue *out* of France, it is ſolely becauſe *we* interfere to keep up the war. Each ſide, in ſhort, with our permiſſion, may now eaſily be brought to a better underſtanding, than if the war had not occurred.

If the queſtion ſhould recur then, with *whom* are we to treat, let the old anſwer alſo recur; treat and make peace at all times with thoſe who can make war; with thoſe who can give orders to 400,000 men to fight, or to diſband; and who, when they ſpeak for themſelves, ſpeak for the men in France who are moſt turbulent and reſtleſs. Peace, like rain to the parched earth, or like repoſe after agony, is too great a bleſſing to be rejected by a harraſſed and blockaded nation, becauſe concluded only by a nominal government, or by baſe authors. The war will not hereafter eaſily be renewed for mere ambition, though now continued for defence; for to renew it would be dangerous as well as futile, unleſs the nation ſhould concur contrary to its intereſts and to probability. The confederates indeed will make no ſacrifice of their ambition to human happineſs, by the offer of a fair and equal peace, till difficulties ſhall no longer leave it as a voluntary meaſure.

Among

Among the pretended original *objects* of the preſent war, the fear of domeſtic factions once held a foremoſt rank; but now it appears ſo little of a cauſe for *war*, that it ſeems only a ſource of ridicule. The abſolute impoſſibility in adminiſtration of proving one inſtance of conſpiracy or inſurrection, where it had been ſo laviſh in its charges of each of them, and the momentous meaſures which were cotemporary with and aided by thoſe charges, lead us to ſuſpect a ſecret connection between the two; and that there was a plot on the ſide of *adminiſtration*, inſtead of the people.

Do not we gratuitouſly make ourſelves out as *principals* in the war, to our own detriment? Why are we to fight for all, pay for all, and wait the convenience of all, and again become the packhorſe and paymaſter of Europe? The *honour* of England is, in this caſe, no otherwiſe committed, than as we may chooſe to commit it to folly. In the Ruſſian war, we officiouſly ſought to defend Pruſſia, without being bound to it; and the ſame we did again lately for Holland; and, anxious for new clients, we now climb the Alps to pay the King of Sardinia for defending his own cauſe, though we ourſelves had ſo lately ſlighted it. Our zeal for the concert of Princes, overlooking all recent animoſities, leads us even to diſtant Ruſſia, our treaty with whom, in the midſt of its burleſque, implies a ſerious tyranny over Denmark and Sweden. With the ſame view, we make treaties in Germany for hiring troops; though, if there is a ſpecies of treaty contrary to firſt principles on both ſides, it is that of buying and ſelling human fleſh, without the conſent of the objects of it, and without regard to the merits of the cauſe in which they are to ſhed their blood; and the expence of it is ſtill more to be complained of, if we are to guarantee the paſture grounds in which theſe unfortunate human cattle are fed.

The preſent war is uſhered in with a concert of Sovereigns, of which the firſt object is every where to cruſh the people, and the firſt conſequence to annihilate the balance of power between nations. Hence will follow the attempt to ſubjugate all the ſmaller or freer powers (ſometimes by bargains made in the midſt

midſt of peace), in order to ſwell the larger and more arbitrary. Poland was thus inſtantly nipped in the bud, for pretending to be free; and France was deſtined to the ſame fate, for the ſame reaſon, but it has proved itſelf a plant of ſturdy growth. England, though boaſting of its freedom, nevertheleſs encourages this univerſal confederacy, in ſpite of the maxim of *divide et impera*; thinking, to all appearance, that there is no danger ſo great as too much liberty. And Hanover, laſtly, which, ſeven years ago, thought it indiſpenſable to form a league againſt *one* preponderating member in the Germanic body, now cements the union between *two* of them, doubtleſs poſſeſſed of ſome ſelf-protecting or other ſecret, incommunicable to England. But why England is ſo eager to replant the Bourbon ſtock, with an Auſtrian graft in it, upon the throne of France, and to re-combine the links of this dangerous chain of connection, remains for wiſer men than myſelf to divine. Why alſo we are to divide France, and throw its remnants into the hands of thoſe, who will next wiſh to divide ourſelves, when France is the only great territorial power, with independent principles, which is able to oppoſe them, is another equally deep enigma.

Do we think, that the other mighty ſpoilers, with whom we are aſſociated, will hear *us* talk of *indemnity and ſecurity*, without aſking the like for *themſelves*; and that if one pulls out a hair becauſe it is white, another will not be ſeparated becauſe it is black; and thus France ſoon will be left bald and bare to the winds of heaven; and reduced to a ſhattered mangled carcaſe, like another Poland, another Germany, or another Italy, the prey of the firſt comer, who ſhall be permitted by the confederacy to faſten upon it.

But what ſeems to me as ſhocking as any other topic in this war, is the mode propoſed for carrying it on, *per fas et nefas*; by diſſentions, inſurrections, and diſtreſs; and in which, if *we* are ourſelves backward, foreigners may ſoon make up for the negligence. When I read of the late Congreſs at Antwerp, which cancelled the Prince of Sax Cobourg's declaration both againſt the partition of France, and in favour of a conſtitutional

King; and recollect that it was done under our auſpices, who received with ſuch placidneſs the Duke of Brunſwick's manifeſto, and now talk of dividing France, both in a political and a territorial ſenſe; I cannot help thinking that we feel ourſelves *in arrears* for the tardineſs of our acceſſion to the confederacy.

But as there is no end to the conſiderations which flow in, I ſhall terminate by a ſhort Addreſs to my Countrymen.

'You have before you, my friends, the choice of two evils.—'The one is, the revival of the power of France, in the way 'in which ſhe is likely to do you leſs harm than ever; be-'cauſe, by her preſent republican government ſhe has loſt all 'her old family connections.—The other evil is, the general 'union eſtabliſhed among the governing powers of the conti-'nent. They have pledged their forces to form, as it were, a 'ſort of *bank*, out of which each is to draw aſſiſtance, who 'ſhall happen to find his ſubjects troubleſome; and as it is not 'likely that there will be much delicacy uſed towards the peo-'ple on this occaſion, this is to be deemed a confederacy, not 'only againſt licentiouſneſs, but againſt liberty; and a prince, 'whoſe own nation, from motives of prudence, ſhall have de-'clared a ſtanding army unconſtitutional and dangerous, may 'eaſily fruſtrate their precaution, by obtaining aſſiſtance from 'the confederacy.—But under the cover of the infatuation 'which produced this union, the three ſtrongeſt continental 'powers have ſuperadded *another* union, for the purpoſe of con-'queſt, which has already made a prey of Poland; and they 'are ſo placed, as to be able to make their ſtrength ſtill ſtronger 'out of other ſpoils, not only in Europe, but Aſia and Africa; 'to ſay nothing of France, which however is the only conti-'nental power left to aid us in oppoſing them, in caſe of need. 'It is not our proper duty to take thought for Hanover, though 'it becomes us to hope, that its cloſe underſtanding with the 'confederated powers will better anſwer its purpoſe, both now 'and hereafter, than can by mere reaſoning be ſuppoſed to be 'probable. But let us conſider that Holland, which was led

'into

'into the war by ourſelves, and which therefore in juſtice de-
'ſerves our attention, I ſay, that Holland may hence eaſily be
'forced to embrace a continental connection, not only contrary
'to its own intereſts, but to ours, eſpecially by *Pruſſia*; which
'will be a moſt ſerious evil, even ſhould it eſcape immediate
'conqueſt.

'With reſpect to our own ſituation, however ſafe it may
'ſeem from immediate invaſion, we muſt recollect, that we are
'chiefly a naval power, in conſequence of our coaſts; but as
'Europe alſo has coaſts, a combination in Europe may ſooner
'or later furniſh a counter-navy, which ſhall render hazardous
'the ſafety of a country like ours, of moderate ſize, and deſti-
'tute of fortifications. The ſame general combination of
'powers may alſo at any time affect all our various branches
'of *continental trade*, by its hoſtile edicts. Our Eaſt Indies
'likewiſe are no more ſafe from Ruſſia, than they would for-
'merly have been from Jenghis Khan, or any other of the
'Eaſtern territorial conquerors, who ſhould have been bent
'upon ſubduing them. Upon comparing therefore the two
'evils offered for our choice, namely, France reſtored, or the
'confederacy triumphant; we ſhall find, that while the one
'evil can only occaſionally affect our quiet; the other, always
'muſt threaten our exiſtence, eſpecially if a future ſovereign
'of our country (and ſuch things may happen) ſhould at any
'time borrow aid from the *confederates* to deſtroy our liberty,
'after being fatigued with the conſtant trouble of defending it
'againſt them.

'You are told, that the partition of Poland does not concern
'you, by men who nevertheleſs know, that the Auſtrian domi-
'nions reach to our channel, and that the Pruſſian dominions
'extend to Holland; and that whatever Auſtria and Pruſſia ob-
'tain by means of Poland, is like ſtrength put into their *right*
'hands, in order to paſs it on to their *left*. They tell you,
'alſo, that Poland formerly has had ſovereigns given to it by
'force; but they do not add, that it was done by compara-
'tively weak powers, and who thereby only gained Poland as
'a temporary *ally*; whereas Poland is now incorporated as a

'*property*, in fee ſimple, by great powers, who have ſtill larger
'poſſeſſions before them attainable by the ſame infallible means.
'Theſe perſons, however, have added one truth, worth all
'the reſt; namely, that we had but one power to aid in op-
'poſing this partition, which is *France*; France, which is now
'endeavoured to be mutilated and rent aſunder. As they
'gravely confeſs alſo, that the Popiſh partition was *irreſiſtible*,
'will they next tell us, by what means we are to prevent the
'to certain abſorption of Germany, Turkey, Italy, and the
North, in due progreſſion, unleſs by the aid of France?

'We hear much of the neceſſity of precautions and ſe-
'curity againſt France being lodged in the hands of ſtrangers;
'but are you not ſick of the fluctuation of politics, when it is
'but a few years ſince we were enthuſiaſts for Maria Thereſa
'of Auſtria; then became her enemy; then renewed the en-
'mity againſt Auſtria under the German league; and again at
'the time of the Ruſſian armament; and now forſooth, ſeem
'about to ſeek to ſtrengthen her hands again by barriers and
'by provinces, when ſhe has ſtrengthened her *own* hands by an
'alliance with the whole of Europe, and by acquiſitions which
'though not yet located are not the leſs certain, and when to-
'morrow ſhe may relapſe and be our bittereſt foe. In ſhort,
'when all Europe is alike given to ambition, it is idle to take
'the trouble of making one the ſtake-holder in preference to
'one another.

'It is not neceſſary in any view, that this war ſhould end
'with an *indemnity*, nor has Mr. Pitt taught us the policy of
'it, by his own conduct; for you had no indemnity for his
'armament for Holland, for Nootka-Sound, or for Oczakow;
'being made contented in every one of theſe caſes, with the
'generous ſentiment, of the *good* you had done, without inquir-
'ing into the origin of the quarrel, in order to fix who had
'been moſt in fault, or who had firſt begun it. It is not there-
'fore out of rule, to end hoſtile aims without delay, when there
'is an end of the conteſt which has provoked them.

'As to the wiſdom of our ſeeking conqueſt, even were con-
'queſt certain, what more is neceſſary to us, after we have at-

'tained

' tained a magnitude of empire ſufficient to enſure our own
' ſafety; unleſs we wiſh to draw upon ourſelves the ſame jea-
' louſy, which attracted ſo many enemies to us during the
' American war; or wiſh to force other nations into new re-
' ſources to countervail the influence of ours; or to hazard the
' ſame internal evils, which have ruined other ſtates when they
' have had too much proſperity, and have over-built their na-
' tive baſes. All that is wanting to us, at preſent, ſeems to be
' the continuance of a good domeſtic government, and a *ſepa-*
' *ration of intereſts* prevailing among the continental powers (in
' the place of their preſent union), ſo as permanently to ſecure
' a balance of power.

' I do not touch upon the burthens of the war, eſpecially of
' a *land* war, with allies in our pay, becauſe you know and
' feel them; and you will know and feel them more; for every
' war has not only taxes to impoſe during its progreſs, but
' leaves a *legacy* of them after its cloſe. But remember, that
' war infeſts communications by ſea and land, produces a ten-
' dancy to private œconomy, waſts people and productions, and
' diſheartens enterprize, not only with you, but with every na-
' tion mixing in or ſuffering by the war; and that the war has
' now nearly embraced the whole of Europe, and thus has
' formed extenſive impediments to trade. Sir William Temple
' gives a ſtriking inſtance of the influence of war upon induſtry,
' in the caſe of the corn trade; and what more important to us
' and to the human race, than to prevent dearth (the parent of
' diſcontent), at a period ſaid to be diſpoſed to revolutions?

' If our Miniſters will not think juſtly for us, we muſt reaſon
' a little for ourſelves. A little confidence towards them is in-
' deed uſeful; but nothing is more dangerous than its *exceſs*,
' becauſe it not only permits, but encourages miſconduct;
' which never can be more impolitic, than when every thing
' may be at ſtake.—Can you ſee then, let me aſk, any reaſon
' for concealing our ultimatum, when no object *can* be ſo preſ-
' ſing to us as terminating the war, and nothing ſo dangerous
' as our Miniſters having a falſe object in ſuch a criſis as the
' preſent. They tell you indeed, that they wiſh not to deceive

' you,

'you, by ſuffering you to think, that the war will ſoon be at 'an end; (a delicacy, which is perhaps deſigned to atone for 'the ruin brought upon ſo many of you, who believed in the 'official aſſurances conſtantly and even lately given you, that 'the war itſelf was improbable, and that there was in any 'event no deſign of meddling in the interior affairs of France.) 'But let them, then, miſlead neither you on one ſide, nor fo-'reign powers on the other, by concealing any longer from you 'the terms in meditation for peace. Are they afraid of an-'nouncing the nature of the peace, leſt it ſhould betray the na-'ture of the war?—If it be ſaid, in order to ſooth you, that 'Miniſters only talk largely, to hide the real approaching cloſe 'of the war; or to induce the French to reſort to better or-'der, as the price of peace; or that in other reſpects they are 'ſure of their grounds; I reply, that a little practice teaches 'us, that nothing is to be left to conjecture, or refinements, in 'great affairs. We muſt therefore conſider miniſters as ſerious 'in their declarations; and *remonſtrate* with them no leſs ſeri-'ouſly; eſpecially, as it will be the beſt means of inclining the 'other powers to peace, when they ſee that they cannot ex-'pect aid much longer from this nation.

'As to the French, if a republic is really their humour, let 'them have it. Never did Mr. Fox ſhew more wiſdom or 'firmneſs, than in propoſing to recogniſe it; his reaſons being, 'as we find, *much deeper* than the mere momentary purchaſe of 'an accommodation. Nothing is more evident, than that 'France was once inclined to join us in inculcating *peace* upon 'all the world, and that ſhe is now inclined to reſiſt the *conti-'nental confederacy*; and can we wiſh for any thing more? 'Torn, as ſhe is, with convulſions, her deſire is ſtill to ſurvive 'as France, and as the child of liberty. Had foreigners at no 'time interfered, her wounds would ſoon probably have healed, 'in the language of medical men, by virtue of the firſt inten-'tion; and the mode of ſtill healing them is, inſtead of throw-'ing into them cauſtics and irritants, to leave them to them-'ſelves, and to the *vis medicatrix naturæ*. When the enemy 'ſhall quit their frontier, and no longer divert their attention,

'and

'and require ſtrong meaſures; the will of France muſt prevail 'over its factions, and that will, I truſt, is good, or with time 'may become ſo; but if not, it is *then* that we muſt have re-'courſe to principles of extermination. And provided it is to 'fight againſt liberty, and ſtill more, againſt licentiouſneſs, 'never let us fear the want of a concurrence for this purpoſe 'among all the arbitrary powers by whom Europe too un-'happily is governed.'

But I here drop my pen; and may it be for ever; and while men of a different temper might look for an approval of their labours, all that I have to aſk in return for them is, a peaceful obſcurity.

A CALM OBSERVER.

THE END.